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Articles
Collective Rights and Individual Remedies:
Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle v.
Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. t
by
JANE BYEFF KORN*
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 1 the United States
Supreme Court held that a wrongful discharge claim brought by a
unionized employee is not preempted by federal labor law.2 Lingle did
not resolve all of the preemption questions that have arisen since organ-
ized employees first asserted the relatively new common-law tort of
"wrongful termination in violation of public policy."'3 Lingle did estab-
lish that unionized employees need not rely exclusively on grievance and
t © Copyright 1990 by Jane Byeff Kom.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona. B.A. 1972, Rutgers University;
J.D. 1983, University of Colorado. I wish to thank my colleague Robert A. Williams, Jr. for
his reading of successive earlier drafts of this Article, and Dan Dobbs, Barbara Atwood, and
Don Sears for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I also want to
thank my research assistants, Maureen O'Connor, Belinda Martin, and Jessica Hogan.
1. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
2. Lingle left open many questions, however, including whether a wrongful discharge
claim by a unionized employee based on the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is preempted by federal labor law; whether a unionized employee can have a
wrongful discharge claim based on the breach of an implied contract; and whether the Court's
holding applies to wrongful discharge cases not based on state statutes.
3. The Arizona Supreme Court summed up the development of the public policy excep-
tion to the at-will rule:
The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine began with a narrow rule permit-
ting employees to sue their employers when a statute expressly prohibited their dis-
charge. See Kouff v. Bethlehem Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d
1059 (1949) (statute prohibiting discharge for serving as an election officer). This
formulation was then expanded to include any discharge in violation of a statutory
expression of public policy. See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App.
2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (discharge for refusal to commit perjury). Courts later
allowed a cause of action for violation of public policy even in the absence of a spe-
cific statutory prohibition.
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 376, 710 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1985).
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arbitration remedies provided for in the vast majority of collective bar-
gaining agreements. When a unionized employee is fired from her job,
Lingle permits that employee to raise common-law tort claims in addi-
tion to pursuing grievance and arbitration remedies.
The preemption controversy began when employers, seeking to limit
their liability to the mild sanctions available under federal labor law,
raised preemption as a defense to organized employees' wrongful termi-
nation tort claims. Resolution of this preemption question required de-
termination of whether an individual claim of wrongful termination by a
unionized worker should be allowed to go forward. This focus on indi-
vidual claims of wrongful termination has resulted in the neglect of a
much broader and more troubling question-the effect on organized la-
bor of recognizing a cause of action for wrongful termination. Allowing
an employer's preemption defense to frame and dominate the question of
whether an individual, unionized employee may bring a wrongful termi-
nation action ignores the troubling policy implications for organized la-
bor that are raised by judicial recognition of wrongful discharge actions.
Judicial recognition of wrongful discharge actions, while necessary
to provide some job security to at-will employees, may be aggravating the
already tenuous position of unions. Unionization has declined in the last
thirty years4 and numerous theories have been suggested to explain this
decline. The proffered reasons range from extra-union factors such as
the troubled economy, to union-related factors such as the inadequacy of
the federal labor laws, to union-specific reasons such as corruption. 5
4. Unionization in this context means union membership. Over the last thirty years,
union density, defined as the number of union members compared to the nonagricultural work
force, has declined. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self Organiza-
tion under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (1983); see also R. FREEMAN & J.
MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 221-45 (1984).
Since the mid-1950s, private sector unionism in the United States has been on the
decline. While the absolute number of union members has increased, the labor force
has grown so much more rapidly that the union share of employees has dropped
precipitously. In 1956, 34 percent of private nonagricultural workers were organ-
ized, and in 1980, just 24 percent-a 10 point decline in union density that is unprec-
edented in American history.
R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra, at 221; see also Baptiste, Challenges to Unions in the 1980s,
in LABOR LAW DEVELOPMENTS, ch. 11-1 (J. Moss ed. 1986) ("While unions currently repre-
sent more than 20 million working men and women in America, the critics quickly point out
that this figure represents only 28 percent of those eligible to join a union-a dramatic decline
from 45 percent in 1954.").
5. R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, supra note 4, at 221-46; see also Belfort, Labor Law and
the Double-Breasted Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego Doctrines and
a Proposed Reformulation, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 67, 68-69 (Although clearly advantageous for
management, the practice of double-breasting-whereby a single "employing entity establishes
both a unionized firm and a nonunionized firm" -poses a significant threat to the labor move-
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While each of these explanations has merit, no single theory fully ac-
counts for the demise of organized labor.
This Article suggests that judicial recognition of wrongful termina-
tion actions by at-will employees is contributing to that demise.6 Since
ment. From the union perspective, double-breasting improperly permits an employer to shed
bargaining and contractual relationships while still retaining the financial benefits of owner-
ship. Double-breasting not only diverts work to the nonunion sector, but it also puts consider-
able pressure on unions to grant wage and benefit concessions so that the shrinking number of
union firms will remain competitive.); Block, Wolkinson & Kuhn, Some Are More Equal Than
Others: The Relative Status of Employers, Unions and Employees in the Law of Union Organiz-
ing, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 220, 223 (1988) (arguing that the traditional labor law doctrines of
employee solicitation rights, union access to the workplace, and employer campaign rights
"have combined to reduce the role and status of employees and unions vis-a-vis employers in
the election process and, in turn, have reduced the probability that employees will select union
representation in NLRB elections"); Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and
the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 357 (1984) ("the troubling
decline of collective bargaining in the private sector must be attributed in large part to the
astonishing increase in employers' use of illegal tactics to resist union representation of their
employees"); Weiler, supra note 4, at 1776-77 ("The decline in union success in representation
campaigns is in large part attributable to deficiencies in the law: evidence suggests that the
current certification procedure does not effectively insulate employees from the kinds of coer-
cive anti-union employer tactics that the NLRA was supposed to eliminate."); Comment,
Union Busters and Front-Line Supervisors: Restricting and Regulating the Use of Supervisory
Employees by Management Consultants During Union Representation Election Campaigns, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 453, 455 (1987) (authored by Charles T. Joyce) ("The growing presence of
consultants on the American industrial landscape undoubtedly contributes to and reflects on
an increasing stridency in management opposition to unionization. This, in turn, is considered
a major determinant in the phenomenal rise in unfair labor practices and the precipitous de-
cline in union membership.").
6. While it may be too early to test this hypothesis empirically, preliminary empirical
work by two economists suggests that some wrongful termination actions may have a negative
effect on union membership. See Neumann & Rissmann, Where Have All the Union Members
Gone?, J. LAB. ECON. vol. 2, no. 2 (1984). This study is not mentioned as empirical support
for my hypothesis but is cited merely to indicate that others are beginning to do empirical
research in the area. In their paper, Neumann and Rissmann hypothesize that the provision of
social welfare benefits by government may be a substitute for unions, thereby contributing to
the decline in unionization. As part of their research, the authors looked at the effect of the
erosion of the employment at will doctrine with the express disclaimer that
recent changes in the employment at will doctrine are not widespread and are suscep-
tible to different interpretations of the rights implied. For these reasons, any quanti-
tative assessment of their impact risks being labeled premature. Nonetheless, the
evidence that we do find indicates declines in union membership, and in its trend, in
precisely those states that have adopted the strongest deviation from the traditional
concept of employment at will, namely, the "implicit contract" interpretation.
Id. at 177. The public policy exception that the authors apparently limited to whistle-blowing
did not have a significant effect on unionization at this early stage, while the implied contract
exception had a demonstrable effect. It should be noted, however, that the authors state that
their pattern of results had "robust to wide amounts of fiddling with the empirical specifica-
tion." The study is flawed from a legal standpoint also because there is no explanation or
differentiation regarding the nineteen or less states that, at the time of the study, recognized
the public policy exception. Finally, there have been considerable changes in the public policy
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the burgeoning of wrongful discharge claims, numerous unionized em-
ployees have ignored reinstatement and back pay remedies made avail-
able through the grievance and arbitration provisions of their collective
bargaining agreements. Instead, unionized employees have brought
wrongful termination actions in state and federal courts7 in an attempt to
recover larger tort awards. These employees are evidencing their disdain
for the protections provided by unions and the grievance and arbitration
process despite the fact that both traditionally are regarded as primary
reasons for unionization.8
The effect of wrongful termination actions on organized labor and
the demise of unionization deserves fuller consideration than it has re-
ceived by courts and commentators. The protection of employees' rights
of self-organization and bargaining are at the heart of our national labor
law. 9 The merits of collective bargaining, which have been widely writ-
ten about, include: worker participation,10 reduction of wage disparity
between white and black workers,"1 increased productivity,1 2 and provi-
exception since the time of the study. In the years since the study, numerous states have either
adopted or expanded their version of the public policy exception. See, e.g., Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (adopting the public policy
exception).
7. See, e.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Hanks v.
General Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1988); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc.,
830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987); Vincent v. Trend W. Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.
1987); Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1985); Garibaldi v. Lucky
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 1099 (1985); Durrette
v. UGI Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Nelson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
648 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mont. 1986); Snow v. Bechtel Const. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514 (C.D. Cal.
1986); Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 644 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1986); Scott v. New
United Motor Mfg., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Hohn v. Kaiser Cement Corp.,
624 F. Supp. 549 (D. Mont. 1986); Faust v. RCA Corp., 612 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Pa. 1985);
Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 610 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Zaks v. American Broadcast-
ing Cos., 626 F. Supp. 695 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Messenger v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 565 (S.D. W. Va. 1984); Taylor v. St. Regis Paper Co., 560 F. Supp. 546 (C.D. Cal.
1983); Friday v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. App. 3d 117, 236 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1986);
Mouser v. Granite City Steel, 121 Ill. App. 3d 834, 460 N.E.2d 115 (1984); Brevik v. Kite
Painting, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 1987); Brinkman v. Montana, 729 P.2d 1301 (Mont.
1986); Richard v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 83 Or. App. 59, 730 P.2d 578 (1986); Carnation
Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1980); Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W.
Va. 1985); see also Leonard, A New Common-law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C.L. REV.
631, 660 (1988).
8. A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 25-26 (3d ed. 1989).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) (amended 1982).
10. Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 29 (1979).
11. Weiler, supra note 4, at 1826.
12. Id. at 1825.
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sion of some measure of worker power.13 The real merit of unionization,
although not subject to empirical validation, may be the fact that
"[c]ollective bargaining ... has provided millions of workers with an
effective voice in industrial government and has brought due process and
human dignity to their working lives." 14
This Article first examines the unexplored implications of judicial
recognition of wrongful termination actions on organized labor. Most
courts considering wrongful termination claims by unionized workers fo-
cus on the nature of the wrongful termination claims at issue and
whether they should be preempted.' 5 For courts considering the effect of
a collective bargaining agreement on individual workers' wrongful termi-
nation claims, the case-by-case method mandated by the preemption ap-
proach necessarily excludes an examination of the collective interest of
unions. Thus, no court has fully considered the ramifications of recog-
nizing the wrongful discharge cause of action for either organized labor
or national labor policy. Answering the question of whether it is fair or
just to preempt a wrongful discharge claim by an individual employee
who belongs to a union does not address the issue of whether there are
any negative implications for organized labor. The Article then critiques
the preemption approach to the question whether unionized employees
may bring a wrongful termination action and the Supreme Court's an-
swer to this question in Lingle. The Court's answer is inadequate be-
cause it considers only the individual interest in pursuing a wrongful
termination claim rather than addressing the group interest at stake.
This Article then suggests that arbitrators be given the authority to
award punitive and compensatory damages, thereby equalizing the reme-
dies available in collectively bargained arbitration proceedings with those
recoverable in wrongful termination actions. This solution would main-
tain the strength of wrongful discharge actions for at-will employees and
protect the policy of encouraging collective bargaining that underlies our
federal labor laws.
13. Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 PuB. INTEREsT 69 (1979).
14. Summers, supra note 10, at 34.
15. A few courts have considered whether the cause of action should be extended, as a
policy matter, to unionized employees. These courts did not, however, consider whether their
recognition of the cause of action itself would have an effect on organized labor. See, e.g.,
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), appeal dismissed,
483 U.S. 1012 (1987); Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752 P.2d 645 (1988);
Lepore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1988).
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I. The Scope of the Problem
A. The NLRA and Wrongful Termination Actions
The National Labor Relations Act 16 (NLRA) affords employees the
right to organize and to bargain collectively with their employers.' 7
Since its enactment in 1935, the NLRA has provided workers with some
measure of job security. The vast majority of collective bargaining agree-
ments protect covered employees' 8 from arbitrary discharge by limiting
terminations to those granted "for cause" or for "just cause."' 19
Unionized workers who are discharged in violation of just cause provi-
sions may seek reinstatement and back pay through grievance and arbi-
tration procedures. 20
An employee typically will file a grievance when she believes that
her rights under the collective bargaining agreement have been violated.
The first step of the grievance is usually a discussion with the employee's
immediate supervisor. If the problem is not resolved to the employee's
satisfaction, the grievance may be brought to higher level management
and "[a]t each stage, management may affirm its original decision, grant
the grievance, or offer to settle it through some form of compromise." '21
16. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)) [hereinafter
NLRA].
17. Section 157 of the NLRA provides that
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in section 8(a)(3) [codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988)].
18. Employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement include union members and
all others in the bargaining unit. The union represents all in the unit, members and non-
members alike. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In this
Article, references to unionized or organized employees refers to all employees represented by
the union, not just to union members. Unless the context specifically provides these, references
do not include those who might be protected by the NLRA by virtue of "concerted activit[y]
... for mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
19. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exer-
cise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1410 (1967) ("just cause" provisions "typi-
cally" found in collective agreements); Taldone, Federal Preemption of Wrongful Discharge
Claims of Union Employees, 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 33, 43 (1986); Zimmerman & Howard-
Martin, The National Labor Relations Act and Employment-at- Will: The Federal Preemption
Doctrine Revisited, 37 LAB. L.J. 223, 227 (1986) (over 90% of all collective bargaining agree-
ments have "just cause" provisions).
20. Taldone, supra note 19, at 43 ("[Ninety-eight] percent of collective bargaining agree-
ments have grievance arbitration procedures .... ").
21. J. GETMAN & B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS, THE BASIC PROCESSES, LAW AND
PRACTICE 162 (1988).
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If not resolved through this progressive grievance system, the union may
choose to bring the matter to binding arbitration.22
Historically, non-unionized employees had no such protection from
arbitrary discharge. In England, the rule was if
the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law con-
strues it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity,
that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout
all the revolutions of the respective seasons; as well when there is work
to be done, as when there is not.23
The United States rejected the British presumption of employment for
one year. Workers without a written employment contract were consid-
ered at-will and were employed at the whim of their employer. Horace
Wood 24 decided unilaterally, and with little precedent to support him,
that "the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will."'25 Pursuant to this employment at will doctrine an
employee could be fired for any reason.26 A purported rationale for the
employment at will doctrine was the notion that both parties to the em-
ployment relationship should have the freedom to terminate that rela-
tionship.27 As it became evident that the parties to the employment
relationship did not stand on equal footing because of the employee's
economic dependence on the employer, dissatisfaction with the harshness
of the employment at will rule increased.
During the last few years, numerous courts have begun to fashion
exceptions to the employment at will doctrine.28 The demise of the doc-
22. Id.
23. H. PERRr'r, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (2d ed. 1987) (citing 1
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 422, 425 (Christian, 12th ed. 1793)).-
24. In addition to creating the employment at will rule, Wood authorized a treatise. See
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (1877).
25. H. PERRITr, supra note 23, at 9 (quoting H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT (1877)); see also Note, Protecting Employees at WillAgainst Wrongful
Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
26. Blades, supra note 19, at 1416; Catler, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the
Employment at Will Rule, 5 INDus. REL. L.J. 471, 472 (1983); Fenn & Wheelan, Job Security
and the Role of Law: An Economic Analysis of Employment-at-Will, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 353
(1984); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal Time for a Statute, 62 VA.
L. REV. 481, 484 (1976).
27. H. PERRIT, supra note 23, at 9.
28. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983) (con-
struing Michigan law regarding implied contract); Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 653
F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Va. 1987) (personnel handbook); Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F.
Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Wagenseller v.
.Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (public policy); Gray v. Supe-
rior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986) (breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing); Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg. Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
(personnel handbook exception); Schmidt v. Yardney Elec. Corp., 4 Conn. App. 69, 492 A.2d
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trine has been widely applauded 29 for providing needed job security to
the vast majority of employees not covered by collective bargaining
agreements. 30 While not all commentators are in accord, 31 judicially
fashioned exceptions to the doctrine rapidly are gaining acceptance and
are recognized in some form in most states. 32
Neither critics nor proponents, however, have considered the possi-
bility that the increasing recognition of a wrongful discharge tort could
affect organized labor negatively. Remedies available to discharged em-
ployees, under the NLRA and most collective bargaining agreements, are
limited to reinstatement and back pay, while successful plaintiffs in
wrongful termination actions can recover extra-contractual damages in-
512 (1985) (public policy); Free v. Holy Cross Hosp., 153 Ill. App. 3d. 45, 505 N.E.2d 1188
(1987) (personnel manual); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464
(1981) (public policy); DeRose v. Putnam Management Co., 398 Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d 428
(1986) (public policy); Beasley v. Affiliated Hosp. Prod. 713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(public policy); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (public
policy); Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1986) (breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 121
N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981) (public policy); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84
N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (public policy); Payne v. Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 585 (Vt. 1986)
(public policy); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)
(personnel handbook and public policy exceptions); Pritchett v. Affinity Mining Co., 356
S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1987) (public policy); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561,
335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (public policy).
29. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 19; Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Neces-
sary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, supra note 26; Note, Protecting
Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1931 (1983); Note, Midgett v. Sackett in the Aftermath of Allis-Chalmers" The Impact of
Federal Labor Law on Retaliatory Discharge Claims, 6 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 347, 348 (1986)
(authored by Bruce Keller).
30. "[In 1978 union membership as a proportion of non agricultural employment stood
at 24.0 percent-the lowest penetration ratio since 1937." Catler, supra note 26, at 495; see
also Blades, supra note 19, at 1410. Moreover, many workers are excluded from the definition
of "employee" in § 152(3) of the NLRA. Finally:
There are many types of employees, like professionals and other members of the
white-collar class, whose numbers are increasing with the advances of modem tech-
nology, who have generally preferred not to be represented by labor unions. For
such employees, it is no answer to suggest that they should seek salvation in unions-
that in order to maintain their personal autonomy in the face of the huge industrial
employer they should surrender it to the massive labor union.
Blades, supra note 19, at 1410-11 (footnotes omitted).
31. See Catler, supra note 26; Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947 (1984); Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 881
(1983); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will: Have the Courts Forgotten The Em-
ployer, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201 (1982) (authored by Charles A. Brake, Jr.).
32. See K. MCCULLOUGH, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYEE AND EM-
PLOYER RIGHTS (1984) (description of each state's particular stance on wrongful termination).
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cluding punitive damages. 33 Some unionized employees, in an attempt to
recover extra-contractual remedies, bypass the procedures provided for
in their collective bargaining agreements and bring tort actions for
wrongful discharge.34
B. An Example of the Problem
The problem discussed here is Well illustrated by a scenario in which
an employee, such as a truck driver employed by a dairy, is told to de-
liver sour milk.35 When the truck driver refuses to deliver the sour milk,
she is discharged, allegedly in violation of state public policy. The truck
driver's recourse traditionally depended on whether she was covered by a
collective bargaining agreement or was an at-will employee.
If the truck driver was covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, 36 it is likely that the agreement contained both a "just cause" dis-
charge provision and a grievance and arbitration provision. 37 The truck
driver would file a grievance with the union and, depending on the par-
ticular collective bargaining agreement involved, begin the multi-step
grievance process that ultimately could lead to binding arbitration.38 If
the arbitrator found that the employer violated the collective bargaining
agreement by discharging the truck driver, the arbitrator would then
fashion the appropriate remedy, generally reinstatement and back pay.39
33. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers' Compensation Claim: The Develop-
ment of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 583 (1986).
34. See cases cited supra note 7.
35. These facts are based on those in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1984), cer denied, 417 U.S. 1099 (1985).
36. An employee need not be a union member to be represented by a union. A union is
the representative of all employees within the bargaining unit regardless of whether an em-
ployee joins the union. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). While
this creates free-rider problems, it does not affect the claim for relief if an employee is dis-
charged in violation of the collective bargaining agreement..
37. The majority of collective bargaining agreements provide that an employee may be
discharged only for "cause" or for "just cause." See Taldone, supra note 19. In addition, the
majority of collective bargaining agreements contain grievance and arbitration procedures. See
supra note 20.
38. For a detailed description of the grievance to arbitration process, see F. ELKOURI &
E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 106-68 (3d ed. 1973).
39. 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 497-520
(2d ed. 1983). According to this author, "[w]here an arbitrator finds that a discharge was not
for 'just cause,' an essential part of the remedy is reinstatement." Id at 499. Moreover,
"[a]rbitrators hold that the power to decide that there is insufficient cause to support the disci-
pline imposed includes -the power to award back pay to remedy the wrong." Id. at 512. An
arbitrator's power to grant additional relief will be discussed in more detail, infra notes 192-
200 and accompanying text.
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Until recently, a truck driver who was an at-will employee would
have had virtually no recourse4° because at-will employees could be fired
for a good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason at all.41 In most states
today, however, the discharged truck driver could bring an action for
wrongful termination under one of the exceptions to the employment at
will doctrine. She could argue that her discharge violated the state's pub-
lic policy of supplying wholesome milk,42 that she had an implied con-
tract with her employer that she would not be fired for refusing to deliver
spoiled milk,43 or that her discharge violated the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.44 The truck driver would prefer to recover in a tort
action under the public policy exception 45 because the damages available
include punitive damages as well as compensatory damages for pain, suf-
fering, and mental anguish.46 These damages often result in greater
40. The employee could have sought relief only if her discharge violated a particular
statute such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
41. See, e.g., Love, supra note 33, at 553.
42. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 1099 (1985); see also, Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710
P.2d 1025 (1985); Schmidt v. Yardney Elec. Corp., 4 Conn. App. 69, 492 A.2d 512 (1985);
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); DeRose v. Putnam
Management Co., 398 Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d 428 (1985); Beasley v. Affiliated Hosp. Prod.,
713 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Payne v. Rozendaal,
520 A.2d 586 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1986); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685
P.2d 1081 (1984); Pritchett v. Affinity Mining Co., 356 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1987); Brockmeyer
v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); DeGuiseppe, The Effect of the
Employment At- Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 1, 30-34 (1981); Weeks, NLRA Preemption of State Common-Law Wrongful
Discharge Claims: The Bhopal Brigade Goes Home, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 607, 614-17
(1986).
43. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983) (con-
struing Michigan law); Corbin v. Sinclair Mktg. Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Free
v. Holy Cross Hosp., 153 Ill. App. 3d. 45, 505 N.E.2d 1188 (1985); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); see also Weeks, supra note 42, at 618-19.
44. See, e.g., Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); Gray v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986); Flanigan v. Prudential Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1986); see also Weeks, supra note 42, at 617-18;
DeGuiseppe, supra note 42, at 24-30.
45. See Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. I11. 1983) (applying Rhode Island
law); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Dare
v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984); K-Mart Corp. v.
Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987). But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d. 657,
765 P.2d 373, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1988).
46. See Smith v. Atlas Offshore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981); Perry v.
Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan.
App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982);
see also J. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CASES 75-77 (1985);
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court awards than are available through arbitration proceedings. Indeed,
the average back pay award by the National. Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) for an unfair labor practice is $2,000,47 while in California the
average recovery in a wrongful termination suit that went to trial was
$450,000 to $548,000, 41 and the average award for- a wrongful termina-
tion claim after a jury trial was $646,855.49
C. Unionized Employees Prefer Wrongful Discharge Actions
Because of the possibility of an enhanced award in a wrongful termi-
nation action, many organized employees who are discharged now prefer
to sue their former employers in tort rather than to proceed under their
collective bargaining agreements or by way of unfair labor practice
charges under the NLRA.50 If a discharged organized employee pro-
ceeds under the collective bargaining agreement or the NLRA, the em-
ployee's remedy is limited to reinstatement and back pay.5 1
The availability of richer redress in a wrongful termination action is
a powerful incentive for an employee to bypass collective bargaining
agreement remedies or to seek a tort recovery in addition to contractual
remedies. The plaintiff in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,
although covered by a collective bargaining agreement, sought the en-
hanced recovery available in a wrongful termination 'ction. Lingle had
participated and prevailed in arbitration proceedings and was awarded
Olsen, Wrongful Discharge Claims Raised By at Will Employees. 4 New Legal Concern for
Employers, 32 LABOR L.J. 265, 283-84 (1981) (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172,
384 N.E. 2d 353 (1978), in which only $749.00 in lost pay was awarded but plaintiff received
$25,000 in punitive damages).
47. A. Cox, 0. BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 262 (10th ed.
1986) (indicating that this was the average back pay award in 1980).
48. "Two recent surveys of California superior court decisions reveal that plaintiffs in
wrongful termination cases prevail in 90-95% of the cases with an. average judgment of
$450,000 to $548,000." Comment, Employment at Will: Just Cause Protection Through
Mandatory Arbitration, 62 WASH. L. REv. 151, 168 (1987) (citing Lopetka, The Emerging Law
of Wrongful Discharge, 40 Bus. LAW. 1 (984) (authored by Warren Martin)), The author
particularly noted the inherent bias in the two surveys. Furthermore:
A February 1984 study by a special committee of the State Bar of California reported
on a survey of California wrongful dismissal cases proceeding to a jury verdict. In 53
percent of the plaintiff verdicts, punitive damages were awarded. In 76 percent of
that 53 percent, awards were greater than $100,000 and in 35 percent, awards ex-
ceeded $600,000.
H. Perritt, supra note 23, at 320-21.
49. J. DERTOUZOS, THE END OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL: "LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
COSTS 15 (1988).
50. See supra note 7.
51. See Zimmerman & Howard-Martin, supra note 19, at 223-24, Section 160(c) of the
NLRA empowers the Board "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of em-
ployees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act."
July 1990]
reinstatement and full back pay. In her state court tort action for wrong-
ful termination she sought "reinstatement in her old job, not simply an-
other job that she was given after the arbitration, back pay at a fully
compensatory level, not the special low amount provided for by the
collective bargaining agreement for those reinstated in arbitration, and
punitive damages." 52 Lingle is not an isolated instance, 53 and neither
organized workers nor the courts have been deterred by the usual collec-
tive bargaining agreement provision that the remedies provided therein
are exclusive.54
I. The Preemption Approach
Until recently, employees covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments who tried to bring wrongful termination actions met with mixed
results. Employers, aware of the likelihood of greater monetary liability
in a tort action for wrongful termination, argued that the action was pre-
empted by federal labor law. Some courts held that the wrongful termi-
nation action was preempted, 55 while others allowed the action to
proceed. 56  This conflict was settled recently by the United States
52. Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (No. 87-259) (filed Dec. 11, 1987).
53. In the following cases, the plaintiff went to arbitration and then sued the employer for
wrongful termination: Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 644 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass.
1986); DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 43 Cal. 3d 517, 733 P.2d 614, 235 Cal. Rptr.
292 (1987); Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor, 114 Ill. App. 3d 396, 449 N.E.2d 203 (1983);
Smith v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 731 P.2d 871 (1987); Cox v. United Technolo-
gies, 240 Kan. 95, 727 P.2d 456 (1986); Gonzalez v. Northwest Airlines, 201 N.J. Super. 422,
493 A.2d 547 (1985).
In the following cases, the plaintiff bypassed arbitration and filed a wrongful termination
claim: Mason v. Continental Group, 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985); Olguin v. Inspiration
Consol. Copper, 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); Nelson v. Owens Coming, 648 F. Supp. 44 (D.
Mont. 1986); Sutton v. Southwest Forest Indus., 628 F. Supp. 1034 (D. Kan. 1985); Friday v.
Hughes Aircraft, 188 Cal. App. 3d 117, 236 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1986); Midgett v. Sackett-Chi-
cago, 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1012 (1987); Payne
v. Pullman, 13 Ill. App. 2d 105, 141 N.E.2d 83 (1957); Schuyler v. Metro. Transit, 374
N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Brinkman v. State, 224 Mont. 328, 729 P.2d 1301 (1986);
MGM Grand v. Insley, 102 Nev. 513, 728 P.2d 821 (1986); Mikaellion v. Drug Abuse Unit,
501 A.2d 721 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1985); Bonner v. Fleming, 734 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987);
Crocker v. Synpol, 732 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Yoho v. Triangle PWC, 336 S.E.2d
204 (W. Va. 1985).
54. In Lingle, for example, the collective bargaining agreement provided that grievance
and arbitration was the exclusive method for resolving a grievance. Brief for Respondent at 5,
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (No. 87-259) [hereinafter Re-
spondent's Brief].
55. See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984);
Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 610 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Costello v. United Parcel
Serv., 617 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
56. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
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Supreme Court in Lingle,57 in which the Court held that state law
wrongful discharge actions by unionized employees are not preempted by
federal labor law.
A. Some Preemption Background
Three types of preemption can be raised in a wrongful termination
action brought by a unionized employee. The first was set out in San
Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon.5 8 In Garmon, the Supreme
Court held that the NLRB has primary jurisdiction whenever the con-
duct at issue is arguably prohibited or arguably protected by section
seven of the NLRA, which protects an employee's right to self-organiza-
tion and to bargain collectively, or to refrain from such activity.59 Ac-
cordingly, if conduct falls within the "arguably protected or prohibited"
arena, both state and federal courts must yield to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the NLRB. If a court finds that the NLRB has exclusive jurisdic-
tion, the case is dismissed and the employee's recovery is limited to back
pay and reinstatement as allowed for by statute. While the NLRB has
the power "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of em-
ployees ... as will effectuate the policies of this Act," 6° this does not
include the power to award punitive damages. 61
The second type of labor preemption involves conduct that a state
may not regulate even though the conduct is neither arguably protected
nor arguably prohibited by section seven of the NLRA. In Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission62 a union refused to work
overtime. Although this conduct was not protected or prohibited by sec-
tion seven, the Supreme Court held that the state could not address this
refusal to work because Congress, in passing the NLRA, wanted such
conduct "to be left to the free, unregulated interplay of the relative eco-
nomic strength of management and union."' 63 Accordingly, some con-
duct may not be regulated by the states because Congress intended it to
remain unregulated. Any attempt by the states to regulate such conduct
therefore is preempted.
417 U.S. 1099 (1985); Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Daugherty v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 975 (D. Ill. 1985); Messenger v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 585
F. Supp. 565 (D. W. Va. 1984); Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
57. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
58. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
59. Id.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 10(c) (1935) (amended 1982).
61. See, eg., NLRB v. Ellis & Watts Prods., Inc., 297 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1962).
62. 427-U.S. 132 (1976).
63. Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 277,
278 (1980).
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Finally, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 6 4
which provides a cause of action for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement, may preempt a state law claim. Pursuant to Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 65 state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over breach of contract actions. A court, however, must apply federal
law in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. A discharged em-
ployee may in theory seek redress under section 30166 but an employee
who does so will find that she first must exhaust remedies provided in the
collective bargaining agreement. 67
Section 301 preemption was perhaps the most frequently litigated
and most problematic preemption question in wrongful termination
claims. 68 Although section 301 pertains to breach of contract claims, it
can also preempt a tort claim for wrongful discharge. In Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 69 the collective bargaining agreement included a disabil-
ity plan and provided for grievance and arbitration of insurance-related
complaints. Instead of filing a grievance, an employee sued both the em-
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 185 (1988).
65. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
66. J. GETMAN & B. PREGREBIN, supra note 21, at 193-94.
67. The Taft-Hartley Act indicates a preference for arbitration. "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective
bargaining agreement." Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). The Supreme Court also has ruled that contractual remedies
are exclusive, Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), and that they must be
exhausted. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 568 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) [hereinafter the Steelworkers Trilogy].
[T]he practical effect of this Maddox-Steelworkers axis is that a union member wish-
ing to sue for breach of his collective bargaining agreement must exhaust the agree-
ment's arbitration procedure. Once the arbitration procedure has run its course,
absent one of the narrow exceptions . .. , the courts will defer to the arbitration
decision and will not allow suit to proceed under the Steelworkers Trilogy rationale.
After exhaustion of such grievance procedure, a subsequent section 301 suit will be
dismissed because of Maddox exclusivity principles.
Comment, Employment At-Will in the Unionized Setting, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 979, 1004
(1985) (footnotes omitted) (authored by David L. Durkin).
68. The wrongful termination claim could be filed either in state or federal court. If filed
in state court, prior to Lingle, it was likely that the defendant would file a removal petition on
the grounds that the state law claim was preempted. The question of a federal court's subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the preemption claim at that point is beyond the scope of this
Article. See, e.g., Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and E. Rwy. Co., 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1986); Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. Williams, 786 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1986); La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transp.
Co., 644 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. I11. 1986); see also Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Juris-
diction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 634, 647-48 (1984) (au-
thored by Richard Levy).
69. 471 U.S. 202, 204 (1985).
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ployer and insurer for bad faith handling of claims-a tort under the
applicable state law. The Supreme Court did not allow -the plaintiff to
evade the exhaustion requirements of section 301 by bringing a tort ac-
tion. The Court held that a tort claim was preempted by section 301 if it
was "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the .terms of the la-
bor contract. '70 Moreover, "when resolution of a state-law claim is sub-
stantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement between
the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a
section 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract
law."' 71 As a result of the test articulated in Allis-Chalmers, each time an
employer raised preemption as a defense to a wrongful discharge action
by a unionized employee, the court had to analyze the elements of the
individual wrongful termination claim on a case by case basis.
The test set forth in Allis-Chalmers proved difficult for. lower courts
to apply. Some subsequent cases involving wrongful termination claims
were held to be preempted while others were not. The nature of the
Allis-Chalmers test, in particular the fact-specific focus on the wrongful
termination claim, contributed to the resulting confusion. Prior to Lin-
gle, which at least put an end to much of the confusion, the question
whether federal labor law preempted a wrongful termination action.
brought by organized employees divided the courtS, 72 sparked debate
among commentators, 73 and resulted in chaotic judicial decisions.
70. Id at 213.
71. Id. at 220 (citation omitted).
72. See, eg., Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814: F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987)
(not preempted); Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986) (preempted); Her-
ring v. Prince Macaroni, 799 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986) (not preempted); Graf v. Elgin, Joliet
and E. Rwy Co., 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1986) (Railway Labor Act preemption).
73. See, e.g., Taldone, supra note 19; Wheeler & Browne, Federal Preemption of State
Wrongful Discharge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1 (1986) (discussing the possibility that
wrongful discharge actions may affect federal labor policy and suggesting a framework for
deciding which cases should be preempted and which should not); Zimmerman & Howard-
Martin, supra note 19, at 223; Comment, supra note 67; Comment, NLRA Preemption of State
Wrongful Discharge Claims, 34 HASTINGs L.J. 635 (1983) (authored by Alan J. Haus); Com-
ment, State Actions for Wrongful Discharge: Overcoming Barriers Posed by Federal Labor Law
Preemption, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 942 (1983) (authored by Judy Hitchcock) Other articles have
examined the question of whether as a matter of policy, as opposed to federal preemption
doctrine, unionized employees should be allowed to maintain a cause of action for wrongful
termination. See, eg., Robbins & Norwood, State Wrongful Discharge Law: Are Unionized
Employees Covered, 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 19 (1986); Note, Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago,
Inc.: Extension of the Tort of Retaliatory Discharge to Employees Covered by Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 16 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 799 (1985) (authored by John Spitz); Note, Midgett
v. Sackett in the Aftermath of Allis-Chalmert" The Impact of Federal Labor Law on Retalia-
tory Discharge Claims, 6 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 347 (1986) (authored by Bruce Keller).
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This debate is illustrated by the disparate outcomes in two decisions
handed down by the Ninth Circuit. In Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 74
for example, an employee was discharged for reporting to local shipping
authorities that a shipment of milk which he had been ordered to deliver,
was spoiled. 75 After the arbitrator found that he was fired for cause, 76
the employee filed a public policy wrongful termination claim. The
Ninth Circuit balanced the state and federal interests and held that the
wrongful discharge claim was not preempted by section 301. The court
identified as the state interest the protection of the health of its citizens
rather than the employer/employee relationship. 77 According to the
court, the remedy for the wrongfully discharged employee was "in tort,
distinct from any contractual remedy an employee might have under the
collective bargaining agreement. '78 In Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated
Copper, 79 however, the Ninth Circuit held that the employee's claim of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy was preempted by the
NLRA. The employee alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for
making safety-related complaints. The court tried to distinguish this
case from Garibaldi on the ground that Olguin's mine safety complaints
were governed by a federal statute that the state had little interest in
enforcing, "even if that federal law is incorporated, as Olguin suggests, in
the state's general public policy."' 80 Both Garibaldi and Olguin illustrate
the difficulty courts faced in determining whether a tort claim was
preempted.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Lingle
Lingle was decided against this background. Jonna Lingle, the
plaintiff, was discharged by Norge for allegedly filing a false workers'
compensation claim. The discharge of an employee in retaliation for fil-
ing a workers' compensation claim is a frequent fact pattern in wrongful
termination cases. 81 When the discharged worker is a union member, the
discharge could be a breach of the collective bargaining agreement:
74. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 1099 (1985). Although decided
before Allis-Chalmers, this case exemplifies the courts' difficulty with these cases.
75. Garibaldi reported the milk's condition to his employers who ordered him to deliver
the milk. Garibaldi instead notified the local health department. Id. at 1368.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1374.
78. Id. at 1375.
79. 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984). Again, this is a pre-Allis-Chalmers decision, but it
illustrates the difficulty in reconciling these cases.
80. Id. at 1475.
81. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton
v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6
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"[s]ince retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim... does not
constitute just cause, such terminations would violate the collective bar-
gaining agreement." 82 Because a discharge resulting from the filing of a
worker's compensation claim also may be a violation of state public pol-
icy, it can serve as the basis for both a state law wrongful discharge claim
and a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.
The plaintiff in Lingle proceeded with a grievance, ultimately pre-
vailed in arbitration, and was awarded reinstatement and full back pay. 83
She also filed a state court action alleging wrongful discharge in violation
of state public policy.84 Others in similar situations have chosen to by-
pass the grievance and arbitration procedure entirely and go directly to
court to allege that their discharge is in violation of the state's public
policy. 5
In response to the type of claim exemplified in Lingle, employers,
seeking to limit recovery to reinstatement and back pay, have argued that
Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Lally v. Copygraphics, Inc., 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d
1317 (1981); see also Love, supra note 33, at 551.
82. Wheeler & Browne, supra note 73 at 29.
83. Respondent's Brief, supra note 54, at 3.
84. The state court action was removed to federal court on diversity grounds where em-
ployer then argued that the claim was preempted. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399 (1988). Her arbitration did not take place until after the lawsuit was filed. Brief
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of Respondent
at 3, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (No. 87-259) (filed on Jan.
23, 1988) [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Brief].
85. In the following cases, the plaintiff went to arbitration and then sued the employer for
wrongful termination: Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 644 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass.
1986); DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 43 Cal. 3d 517, 733 P.2d 614, 235 Cal. Rptr.
292 (1987); Koehler v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 109 Ill. 2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 542 (1985);
Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 396, 449 N.E.2d 203 (1983); Smith v.
United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 731 P.2d 871 (1987); Cox v. United Technologies,'240
Kan. 95, 727 P.2d 456 (1986); Gonzalez v. Northwest Airlines, 201 N.J. Super. 422, 493 A.2d
547 (1985); Dority v. Green Country Castings, 727 P.2d 1355 (Okla. 1986).
In the following cases, the plaintiff bypassed arbitration and filed'a wrongful termination
claim: Mason v. Continental Group, 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985); Olguin v. Inspiration
Consol. Copper, 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984); Nelson v. Owens Coming, 648 F. Supp. 44 (D.
Mont. 1986); Peoples v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 638 F. Supp. 402 (M.D. Pa. 1985);
Sutton v. Southwest Forest Indus., 628 F. Supp. 1034 (D. Kan. 1985); Birtell v. Lockheed, 201
Cal. App. 3d 293, 247 Cal. Rptr 86 (1988); Friday v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. App. 3d
117, 236 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1986); Albertson's, Inc. v. Rhoads, 196 Colo. 159, 582 P.2d 1049
(1978); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), appeal
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1012 (1988); Payne v. Pullman, 13 Ill. App. 2d 105, 141 N.E.2d 83 (1957);
Schuyler v. Metro. Transit, 374 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. App. 1985); Smith v. Montana Power, 225
Mont. 166, 731 P.2d 924 (1987); Brinkman v. State, 224 Mont. 238, 729 P.2d 1301 (1986);
MGM Grand Hotel-Reno, Inc. v. Insley, 102 Nev. 513, 728 P.2d 821 (1986); Mikaellion v.
Drug Abuse Unit, 501 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1985); Carnation v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450 (S. Ct. Tex.
1980); Bonner v. Fleming, 734 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App. 1987); Crocker v. Synpol, 732 S.W.2d
429 (Tex. App. 1987); Yoho v. Triangle PWC Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1985).
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the state law action is preempted. Lingle's employer argued that section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempted her tort claim.
The Supreme Court held that Lingle's state law claim was not preempted
after applying the following test: "[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim
depends upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement, the ap-
plication of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there
could be as many state-law principles as there are states) is preempted
"86
In reaching this decision the Court noted that in order to prove re-
taliatory discharge under Illinois law, Lingle had to establish that her
employer's motive in discharging her was to deter her from exercising
her rights under the workers' compensation statute. According to the
Court, this analysis does not
turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Thus, the state law remedy in this case is "independent" of the
collective bargaining agreement in the sense of "independent" that
matters for 301 preemption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim
does not require construing the collective bargaining agreement. 87
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ste-
vens, held that a court could determine whether the employer's actions in
discharging Lingle constituted a retaliatory discharge under state law
without having to interpret the just cause provision of Lingle's collective
bargaining agreement. The Court stated that the retaliatory discharge
claim was "independent" of the collective bargaining agreement and that
preemption was inappropriate. 88
The court of appeals in Lingle defined "independent" quite differ-
ently from the Supreme Court. For the court of appeals, the just cause
provision of the collective bargaining agreement might have prohibited
the retaliatory discharge. Moreover, because deciding the retaliatory dis-
charge claim would involve the same facts as a determination whether
the collective bargaining agreement had been violated, the court of ap-
peals held that the state law claim was not independent of the collective
bargaining agreement and, therefore, preemption was appropriate.8 9 The
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the appellate court's definition of
"independent." 90
86. 486 U.S. at 405-06.
87. Id. at 407.
88. Id. at 410.
89. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1044-47 (7th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
90. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1988).
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Although Lingle did not resolve all preemption issues,91 it did hold
that when a unionized worker is discharged in violation of a state statute,
the employee's tort suit for wrongful termination in violation of state
public policy is not preempted by federal labor law.92 The Supreme
Court's holding in Lingle acknowledges that unionized employees may
seek relief under their collective bargaining agreements as well as state
tort law. Yet, this perceived victory for labor may have seriously under-
mined the group interest fostered by the collective process of our national
labor policy. The preemption question, as raised in Lingle, focused al-
most exclusively on the rights of the individual to pursue an individual
claim and did not consider the underlying effect such wrongful termina-
tion actions would have on unionization.
C. Arguments For and Against Preemption
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle, the lines were
drawn between those who argued that wrongful discharge claims by
unionized employees should be allowed (Anti-preemptionists) and those
who argued that state law wrongful discharge claims by unionized em-
ployees should not be allowed (Pro-preemptionists).
(1) Arguments Against Preemption: Why Unionized Employees Should Be
Allowed to Bring Wrongful Discharge Claims
According to the Anti-preemptionists, limiting organized employees
to the remedies provided in their collective bargaining agreements pro-
duces an anomalous result. If unionized employees are prohibited from
pursuing wrongful termination claims, they will have less protection
from arbitrary discharge, in terms of allowable remedies, than their at-
will counterparts. Organized workers traditionally receive only rein-
statement and back pay while at-will employees have the possibility of
damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish as well as punitive
damages. Ultimately, prohibiting unionized employees from pursuing
wrongful discharge claims has the effect of providing less protection to
91. Preemption questions left open after Lingle include whether a wrongful discharge
claim by a unionized employee based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is preempted and whether a unionized employee may bring a wrongful discharge claim
for breach of an implied contract. Moreover, the preemption questions raised in Garmon and
Machinists remain open after Lingle. Lingle does appear, however, to have ended the case-by-
case approach to public policy wrongful discharge claims by unionized employees at least
when the tort claims are based on a state statute.
92. 486 U.S. at 407. The state claim will be preempted only in those instances in which
resolution of the state law claim depends on interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement.
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unionized employees than to at-will employees. Unionized employees lit-
erally are penalized for being represented by a union.
This anomaly can be rectified by allowing unionized employees to
proceed with state law actions for wrongful termination either in place of
or in addition to the grievance and arbitration procedures specified in
their collective bargaining agreements. 93 Anti-preemptionists argue that
unionized employees should not be limited to the remedies provided for
in their collective bargaining agreements because such remedies are
incomplete.94
In Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.,95 for example, the Illinois
Supreme Court extended the tort of retaliatory discharge to employees
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The majority relied on
two policy rationales. First, the court held that unionized employees
must be allowed to sue in tort because remedies under their collective
bargaining agreement were inadequate:
[T]here is no reason to afford a tort remedy to at-will employees but to
limit union members to contractual remedies under their collective
bargaining agreements. Generally, if a union employee's grievance
goes to arbitration and the arbitrator does not find just cause for the
discharge, the remedy will be simply job reinstatement and full back
pay. 96
In addition to providing adequate relief to unionized employees (those
who traditionally are confined to grievance and arbitration remedies) the
Illinois Court wanted to assure that employers, whether unionized or
not, are subject to sanctions for violating the state's public policy. The
Court noted:
If there is no possibility that an employer can be liable in punitive
damages . . ., there is no available sanction against a violator of an
important public policy of this State. It would be unreasonable to im-
munize from punitive damages an employer who unjustly discharges a
union employee, while allowing the imposition of punitive damages
against an employer who unfairly terminates a nonunion employee.
93. See, e.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 111. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984),
appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1012 (1987); Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 752
P.2d 645 (1988); Lepore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 224 N.J. Super. 463, 473, 540 A.2d
1296, 1301 (1988). These cases assessed whether, as a matter of policy, unionized employees
should be allowed to bring wrongful termination claims in addition to, or instead of, address-
ing whether the cause of action should be preempted. The same arguments apply with equal
force to the policy questions and the preemption questions.
94. See, e.g., Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 23, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (No. 87-259) (filed on Dec. 11, 1987) [hereinafter AFL-CIO
Brief].
95. 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S. 1012 (1988).
96. Id. at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-84.
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The public policy against retaliatory discharges applies with equal
force in both situations. 97
Finally, in addition to these concerns, Anti-preemptionists argue
that precluding unionized employees from pursuing wrongful discharge
claims hurts organized labor. They urge that unionized workers must be
allowed to bring-wrongful termination claims or employees quickly will
learn that by electing a union, they sacrifice the possibility of punitive
and other compensatory damages and, in fact, the right to bring state law
actions for wrongful discharge. Although employees may hear of the
advantages of organization such as the collective power of the union, the
higher wages that accompany unionization, and the fact that the griev-
ance and arbitration process provides a quicker and less costly remedy
for a wrongful termination, these advantages may pale in comparison to
the large damage awards possible in a state action for wrongful termina-
tion. At some point, employees are likely to perceive that the sacrifice of
their common-law rights is a strong incentive not to unionize.98
Anti-preemptionists, including organized labor, argue that because
preemption limits unionized employees to contractual remedies while
making tort damages available to their nonunionized counterparts, pre-
emption would cause a further decline in, unionization.99 Preempting all
wrongful termination claims prevents unionized -employees from pursu-
ing a common-law tort action, the remedy they perceive as most effective
for arbitrary discharge. Organized employees might, therefore, decide
against unionization. 100
Anti-preemptionists thus have three concerns underlying their posi-
tion that unionized employees should be allowed to pursue state law
97. Id. at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
98. Employees also would have an incentive to decertify an already existing union or to
seek employment in a non-unionized setting or one not covered by a collective bargaining
agreement.
99. Organized labor's position was-generally anti-preemption. See, e.g., AFL-CIO Brief,
supra note 94. The Union's argument in Lingle was essentially that: (1) the state law at issue
did not burden the collective bargaining process but rather merely set up minimum rights
applicable to all employees; and (2) the presumption favoring arbitration did not apply because
the case did not involve a dispute concerning the collective bargaining agreement.
Unions were in an unenviable position during the preemption debate. If they argued in
favor of preemption, it would seem that they did not want their members to have adequate
protection or enhanced damage awards. Politically, it would be untenable for a union to ap-
pear in favor of preemption. However, it also may have been politically unwise, at least in the
short run, for unions, already in a state of serious decline, to take a position against preemp-
tion. The ready availability of enhanced damage awards in wrongful termination cases may
make unionization appear superfluous and, in. the long run, cause a further decline in
unionization.
100. Organized employees could decide to decertify an elected union. Unorganized em-
ployees might decide to vote "no union" on this basis.
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wrongful discharge claims in addition to remedies provided for in collec-
tive bargaining agreements, including: adequate relief for individual
unionized employees, sanctions against employers who violate state pub-
lic policy, and the possible negative effect on organized labor.
(2) Arguments for Preemption: Why Unionized Employees Should Not Be
Allowed to Bring Wrongful Discharge Actions
At first glance it might appear that allowing unionized employees to
pursue wrongful termination claims in addition to or instead of their con-
tractual remedies would benefit unionized workers and consequently
unions. Pro-preemptionists who argue that unionized employees should
not be allowed to pursue wrongful discharge claims, however, assert that
permitting unionized employees to seek remedies beyond those provided
in their collective bargaining agreements would have a negative effect on
organized labor. 101 According to the Pro-preemptionist view, the ability
to sidestep the bargained for remedies would weaken a union's overall
bargaining power and adversely affect management-union relationships.
Allowing unionized employees to disregard the collective bargaining
agreement also would have a negative effect on the use of arbitration and
would undermine that process. 102
Although this argument was made to the Supreme Court in Lingle,
the Court did not address it.103 The Court was concerned with keeping
the "interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements ... firmly in the
arbitral realm; judges can determine questions of state law involving la-
bor-management relations only if such questions do not require constru-
ing collective-bargaining agreements.'1°4 Although the Lingle Court did
not explain why it felt arbitrators should have primary responsibility for
interpreting collective bargaining agreements, it presumably was con-
cerned with avoiding conflicting interpretations of collective bargaining
agreements by arbitrators and judges. The Court failed to note, however,
that avoiding conflicting interpretations is not the only virtue of preemp-
tion. From a Pro-preemptionist standpoint, the Supreme Court ne-
101. Wheeler & Browne, supra note 73, at 30-32 (insufficient weight has been given to the
principles of preemption, and except in narrowly defined circumstances, causes of action based
upon public policy should be precluded where an employee has access to the grievance and
arbitration procedures of a collective bargaining agreement, regardless of whether concerted
activity is involved); Weeks, supra note 42, at 690; see also Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.,
105 Il1. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984) (Moran, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 483 U.S.
1012 (1987).
102. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 153, 473 N.E.2d at 1285 (Moran, J., dissenting).
103. Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 84, at 13-14.
104. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411.
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glected the fact that preemption of wrongful discharge claims by
unionized workers would help maintain the primacy of the arbitral pro-
cess. Allowing unionized employees to pursue a cause of action that per-
mits recovery of damages far in excess of those available through
arbitration might undermine the arbitral process as much as conflicting
interpretations. 1 0 5
More than twenty years before Lingle, however, in Republic Steel v.
Maddox, 10 6 the Supreme Court recognized that an employee could not
seek a civil remedy to the exclusion of the grievance procedure. In an
opinion written by Justice Harlan, the Court held that a unionized em-
ployee could not bypass the grievance procedure specified in her collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Justice Harlan stated:
A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to com-
pletely sidestep available grievance procedures has little to commend
it.... [lit would deprive employer and union of the ability to establish
a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee
grievances. If a grievance procedure cannot be made exclusive, it loses
much of its desirability as a method of settlement. A rule creating
such a situation "would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon
both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements." 10 7
In Republic Steel, the Supreme Court recognized the importance to em-
ployers and unions of arbitration as the exclusive method of dispute
resolution.
For those who advocate the preemption of all wrongful termination.
actions by unionized employees, the reasoning of Republic Steel is appli-
cable today. If unjustly terminated employees routinely are allowed to
bypass their bargained for remedies, these remedies become meaningless
to both employees and employers. Employees can engage in forum shop-
ping, deciding between arbitration and court, or try the arbitration pro-
cess and then get a second bite of the apple by filing a tort action.10 8
Employers, as a result of Lingle, have no reason to agree to or cooperate
105. The Court did note that unionized employees are allowed to bring section 1983 and
Title VII claims in addition to grievance and arbitration procedures. Id. at 412. The effect of
this on organized labor is unknown. It may be that the combination of allowing unionized
employees to bring section 1983, Title VII, and public policy claims has troubling implications
for organized labor.
106. 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
107. Id. at 653 (quoting Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)).
108. Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 644 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1986);
DeTomaso v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 43 Cal. 3d 517, 733 P.2d 614, 235 Cal. Rptr. 292
(1987); Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor, 114 Ill. App. 3d 396, 449 N.E.2d 203 (1983); Smith v.
United Technologies, 240 Kan. 562, 731 P.2d 871 (1987); Cox v. United Technologies, 240
Kan. 95, 727 P.2d 456 (1986); Gonzalez v. Northwest Airlines, 201 N.J. Super. 422, 493 A.2d
547 (1985).
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with arbitration procedures if an employee can, at her discretion, sidestep
arbitration and file a tort claim. As succinctly argued to the Supreme
Court in Lingle, wrongful discharge claims must be preempted or
employers will be routinely required to litigate employee discharge
claims in multiple forums. Such multiple forum litigation may well
force employers to dispense with the forum they can avoid-arbitra-
tion-even though arbitral procedures provide the quickest, easiest
and least expensive method of fairly adjudicating employees' discharge
claims. This, in turn, ultimately would operate to the detriment of the
system of labor-management relations that has served employers and
employees well in the over fifty years since the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was passed. 0 9
Pro-preemptionists therefore argue that Lingle undermines the effective-
ness of arbitration as the exclusive method of dispute resolution.
Pro-preemptionists assert that allowing an alternative to collective
bargaining ultimately will weaken the union's negotiating position. They
argue that "[a]ccording every grievant an opportunity to relitigate the
merits of his claim could undermine the grievance procedure." 110 If em-
ployees can ignore arbitration procedures, employers may refuse to in-
clude arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements,
ultimately undermining the entire process.
In addition, preemption of all wrongful termination claims by
unionized employees would avoid any possible conflict between federal
labor law and state policy. It would insure that state law does not inter-
fere with the goal of a uniform federal law, which was, after all, Con-
gress' intent in passing the NLRA.I l l Finally, preemption would
maintain the congressional preference 1 2 for arbitration of industrial dis-
putes by forcing unionized workers to rely on remedies provided in their
collective bargaining agreements. This approach is preferred because in
the words of two commentators, "continued erosion of the principle of
exclusivity of arbitration can only have the effect of consigning arbitra-
tion to the status of a second-rate and disfavored method of dispute
resolution."" 3
The Pro-preemptionists, therefore, take the position that allowing
unionized employees to pursue state law remedies as an alternative to
109. Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 84, at 2-3.
110. VanderVelde, Making Good on Vaca's Promise: Apportioning Back Pay to Achieve
Remedial Goals, 32 UCLA L. REV. 302, 313 (1984). Although made in a different context,
VanderVelde's statement that allowing relitigation of grievances may harm the entire process
is equally applicable here.
111. See, e.g., Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-05 (1962).
112. See, e.g., A.T.& T. Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of America, 475
U.S. 643, 650 (1989).
113. Wheeler & Browne, supra note 73, at 31-32.
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their collectively bargained remedies ultimately would weaken the arbi-
tral process. According to the Pro-preemptionists, unless the wrongful
termination claims of unionized employees are preempted, there will be a
negative effect on the primacy of arbitration that will, in turn, affect or-
ganized labor.
III. For Organized Labor, Either Answer to the Preemption
Question Will Hurt
As discussed above, both Anti-preemptionists and Pro-preemption-
ists assert that their opponents' position would hurt organized labor.
The Anti-preemptionists argue that unionized employees should be al-
lowed to pursue state law remedies or they will be less protected from
arbitrary discharge, in terms of remedies, than their at-will counterparts.
Pro-preemptionists argue that permitting unionized employees to pursue
state law wrongful discharge claims will undermine the arbitral process
and collective bargaining system.
Courts and commentators fail to realize that, in essence, both sides
are correct. Either answer to the preemption question could hurt organ-
ized labor because ultimately it is the existence of wrongful discharge
actions that threatens organized labor. Regardless of whether or not the
wrongful discharge claims of unionized employees are preempted,
unionized employees now know that alternative protection from arbi-
trary discharge is available under the common law and that the common
law provides greater monetary relief than collectively bargained for rem-
edies. If wrongful discharge claims by organized employees are pre-
empted, organized employees will not be able to recover extra-
contractual damages and will realize that the common law provides a
better remedy than their collective bargaining agreements. If, on the
other hand, wrongful discharge claims by organized employees are not
preempted, employees' incentive to rely on grievance and arbitration is
decreased because of the unequal remedy structure.
For organized labor, therefore, either answer to the preemption
question has potentially negative implications. In fact, the preemption
question is merely a red herring that focuses attention on the individual
and diverts attention from the group interest inherent in our collective
bargaining system. The Supreme Court's test focuses on facts pleaded by
the individual plaintiff. "If resolution of a state-law claim is substantially
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement between the par-
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ties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a section 301
claim or dismissed as preempted."' 1 4
Ultimately, the preemption approach to the question whether
unionized employees should be allowed to pursue wrongful termination
claims in addition to grievance and arbitration does not even consider
organized labor as a whole. By its very nature, a preemption approach to
the wrongful discharge of individuals does not consider the idea of collec-
tive good that underlies unionization. The test does not consider the col-
lective bargaining agreement or the union, or even employer-union
relations. In Lingle, for example, the Court held that the plaintiff's retal-
iatory discharge claim involved "purely factual questions pertain[ing] to
the conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the em-
ployer."115 Accordingly, the claim was not preempted because resolu-
tion of the facts did "not turn on the meaning of any provision of a
collective-bargaining agreement."'1 6 The focus is on the facts of the indi-
vidual claim and whether resolution of that claim requires interpretation
of a particular collective bargaining agreement. The impact on unions of
resolving whether an individual's claim is or is not preempted is simply
not a factor.
A. The Existence of Wrongful Discharge Actions Effects Organized Labor
The preemption approach, with its inherent focus on the individual,
draws attention away from troubling policy questions. Although neces-
sary to protect at-will employees, wrongful termination actions are being
brought by unionized employees. It is time to focus on the effect of judi-
cial recognition of a cause of action for wrongful termination on the col-
lective, organized labor.
(1) Why Workers Join Unions
It is important to understand why workers unionize in order to un-
derstand the negative implications that judicial recognition of wrongful
discharge actions have on organized labor. Employees do not join unions
simply to get higher wages. 1 17 In large part, workers join unions for job
security.
In industrial unions, many workers join because of some incident in
the plant in which they experienced or witnessed what they considered
to be unfair or arbitrary action by a foreman or supervisor. The possi-
114. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
115. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988).
116. Id.
117. A. REEs, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 25 (2d ed. 1977).
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bility of limiting or redressing such action through the grievance pro-
cedure is thus a primary-motive for union membership and support of
the organization. In a study of a large local industrial union in which
114 local leaders, active members, and rank and file members were
interviewed about their reasons for joining the union, such experiences
were frequently mentioned, though not one worker mentioned
wages. 118
This desire for job security has not changed significantly over the
years. At a recent labor law conference, a prominent management attor-
ney remarked that "the most persuasive argument used by unions... is
that employees need protection against management actions that are ar-
bitrary or inequitable."' 1 9 Unionization and the grievance and arbitra-
tion lprocess that usually follows do provide job security. Grievance and
arbitration is an effective mechanism for employees to resolve their con-
tested discharges.
Grievance and arbitration offer two main advantages over litigation.
Arbitrating a discharge is far quicker than litigating a wrongful termina-
tion claim in court. The average time elapsed between requesting an ar-
bitrator and an award is about 225 days 120 compared with about three
years from the date of filing to trial.1 21 The time between discharge and
an adjudication of the merits of that discharge is important to employees
for two reasons. First, the unemployed plaintiff is not receiving a
paycheck and the economic impact of the time unemployed is readily
apparent. In addition, the discharge itself may have an emotional impact
on the plaintiff, especially if the plaintiff is unemployed for a long period
of time. One plaintiff's attorney remarked that the long delays involved
in getting to trial hurt individual employees who may be "slipping
'deeper and deeper in debt or depression from which they may never
recover, irrespective of the results.' ",122
Arbitration also is far less expensive than litigation. In 1985, the
average per diem charge for an arbitrator was $317 and the average total
118. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
119. Comments by James N. Adler of the law firm of Irell & Manella at the San Francisco
session of the 1987 Employment Law Conference sponsored by the Bureau of National Affairs
and the National Employment Law Institute, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at A-4 (Dec.
21, 1987).
120. Court Hearing of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Mediation and Concilia-
tion, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at A-10 (May 14, 1986) ("The time between request for a
panel and an award averages 200 days with AAA and 260 days with FMCS.") [hereinafter
Presidential Advisory Committee].
121. J. DERTOUZOS, E. HOLLAND, & P. EBENER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 24 (1988) [hereinafter LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES].
122. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 159, at A-8 (Aug. 17, 1988).
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bill was $1200.123 In stark contrast, the average wrongful termination
action costs a defendant about $80,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses. 124
The grievance and arbitration procedure commonly found in collec-
tive bargaining agreements therefore provides an employee a mechanism
to ensure some measure of job security. In addition, for employees decid-
ing whether to unionize, the protection afforded by grievance and arbi-
tration is a strong incentive to organize.
(2) The Decline in Unionization
Despite the promise of job security offered by organization, unioni-
zation has declined dramatically in the last thirty years. In the 1950s, at
least one-third of all nonagricultural workers were organized. By 1980,
that percentage fell to less than one-quarter. The cause of this ten point
decline is the subject of much speculation, 125 but one reason may be that
workers now get some of the advantages of union representation without
unionizing.
Economists Neumann and Rissmann postulate that the "provision
of certain social welfare benefits by government substitutes for the pri-
vate provision by unions, thereby reducing the attractiveness of union
membership."' 126 Empirical studies support their theory. When the
NLRA was originally enacted in 1935 there were virtually no statutory
protections for at-will employees. In the years following the passage of
the NLRA numerous other social welfare statutes were enacted, many of
them to provide security to workers. Such legislation includes the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938127 (providing minimum wages, mandatory
overtime, and prohibiting oppressive child labor), the Social Security Act
of 1935128 (providing unemployment, retirement, and disability benefits),
state unemployment insurance statutes, 29 state worker compensation
123. Presidential Advisory Committee, supra note 120, at A-10.
124. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 121, at 37.
125. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
126. Neumann & Rissmann, supra note 6, at 175. But see Hayserman & Maranto, The
Union Substitution Hypothesis Revisited: Do Judicially Created Exceptions to the Termination-
At-Will Doctrine Hurt Unions 72 MARQ. L. REV. 317 (1989). This Article concludes that
wrongful termination was not having a significant effect on union representation elections (as
opposed to union membership which was studied by Neumann & Rissmann) as of 1983, the
last date of their statistics. As noted supra note 6, there have been many changes in wrongful
termination since 1982 and in employees' perceptions of the existence of wrongful termination
actions. In addition, the study does not consider the effect of preemption and most signifi-
cantly, the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle that wrongful termination actions by unionized
employees are not preempted.
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1981).
129. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-601 to -799 (1971 & Supp. 1989).
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statutes,1 30 the Civil Rights Act of 1964131 (prohibiting discrimination in
employment), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970132
(providing safety standards).
Although necessary to provide some minimum level of protection
for at-will workers, this legislation may have hindered the growth of
unions. "It is ironic that while the bulk of the legislative agenda of the
labor movemenit-social insurance, minimum wages, safety and health,
and full employment-primarily benefits nonunion workers, these work-
ers do not identify with the unions."1 33 Commentators have noted that
workers are more likely to join unions when they are dissatisfied with
working conditions and believe that the union is their only hope. 134 The
legislation enacted to protect employees may actually have reduced the
attractiveness of organization because the legislation was perceived as a
substitute for unionization. Prior to 1970, for example, employees faced
with unsafe working conditions could seek protection either through
state laws that were largely inadequate or from unions. The passage of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970135 offered an alternative
to unions by providing employees with a mechanism for complaining
about job safety even without a union. Moreover, while unions initially
were the source for some standard of decent wages, the increasing cover-
age of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938136 has extended minimum
wages to an increasing number of workers.
Exceptions to the doctrine of employment at will in the form ofjudi-
cial recognition of wrongful termination actions may be viewed as the
provision of a social welfare benefit by government. Consequently,
unionization may be affected by wrongful termination actions in much
the same way that it is affected by the provision of other social welfare
benefits.
As discussed above, it appears at first glance that allowing unionized
employees to pursue wrongful termination claims in addition to or in-
stead of their contractual remedies would benefit individual unionized
workers and, therefore, unions. In the long run this reasoning is faulty,
130. See, eg., ALA. CODE §§ 25-5-1 to -231 (1975 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48,
para. 138.1-.30 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 656.001-.990 (1989).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964).
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
133. UNIONS IN CRISIS AND BEYOND, PERSPECTIVES FROM SIX COUNTRIES 49 (R.
Edwards, P. Garonna & R. Todtling, eds. 1986).
134. See J. WALLIHAN, UNION GOVERNMENT & ORGANIZATION 30 (1985); S. BARKIN,
THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 25-26 (1961).
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
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however, because it fails to consider that the existence of the tort action
will make unionization appear superfluous to employees concerned with
job security. Because employees unionize primarily to obtain the benefit
of job security, 137 the existence of a wrongful termination action will be
perceived as a substitute for unionization. Moreover, because the mone-
tary remedies available in a wrongful discharge case exceed those recov-
erable under a collective bargaining agreement, wrongful discharge
actions may appear preferable to unionization. From the employee's per-
spective, union dues are unnecessary if the common law provides job se-
curity that is as good as or better than that provided by unionization.
Therefore, while the availability of wrongful termination actions may ad-
vantage individual employees who are wrongfully discharged, it will ulti-
mately disadvantage the collective groups of employees that benefit from
unionization.
(3) Why Unionization Matters
Some critics of organized labor argue that unions have outlived all
usefulness. 138 Union proponents, however, assert that the labor vision
embodied in the Wagner Act 139 is still valid today. 14° As noted by A.H.
Raskin, former Chief Labor Correspondent for the New York Times,
unions retain their validity as "a champion of the interests of wage earn-
ers and as a social counterweight to the power of business and
finance." 141
Unionization also continues to provide collective strength. Accord-
ing to Judge Mikva, "[t]he explicit message of the Act was that workers
needed protection because, individually, they could not protect them-
selves." 142 Workers still need unions and collective bargaining today.
Wrongful termination actions do not replace the strength of the collec-
tive bargaining process. As Paul Weiler noted, "[t]he central premise of
137. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
138. Abraham, Individual Autonomy and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: Union
Resignations and Strike Breaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1298 (1989).
"In short, many view unions as 'rent seeking' cartels that establish monopoly wages, often at
the expense of consumers and other employees, and stultify the entire economy. They are
dysfunctional, often corrupt and crass special interests." Id. (citing, e.g., R. LEKACHMAN,
GREED IS NOT ENOUGH: REAGANOMICS 1-20 (1984); Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 999-1011 (1982)).
139. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168 (1982)).
140. Weiler, supra note 4, at 1822-27.
141. Raskin, The Role and Challenges Facing Unions in the 1940s and the 1980s-a Com-
parison, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071 (1984).
142. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (1986).
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the NLRA is that purely individual dealings between employer and em-
ployee will not produce fair and decent employment conditions." 143
While wrongful termination actions provide some protection for at-will
employees, they are not a substitute for unionization. Wrongful termina-
tion actions focus on wrongs done to an individual employee. Employer
wrongdoing is corrected after the fact, and then only on a case by case
basis. The collective strength of employees is necessary to ensure decent
working conditions.
The possibility of unionization may limit employer power over em-
ployees. Without the threat of unionization, an employer has little incen-
tive to improve working conditions. Getman and Kohler have pointed
out that "if employees want to trade their right to bargain collectively
(and many do), they are in a much stronger position when they have a
legal right to secure union representation if they are dissatisfied with
what the employer has provided."' 44
Contrary to the stereotype that unionization hurts the employer,
unionization may actually help the employer. As support for legislation
allowing nonprofit hospital workers to unionize, Senator Cranston intro-
duced evidence of lower turnover and better job stability and security at
two hospitals that unionized. 145 In fact, "[r]ecent empirical research in-
dicates that . . . [e]mployees who work under a collective' bargaining
agreement may actually be more productive than those employed in an
otherwise comparable nonunion environment."1 46 It is unlikely that this
result would follow individual wrongful termination claims.
It appears, therefore, that unionization may help both employees
and employers. Unionization provides collective strength for employees
and may result in a more efficient workplace for the employer.
According to Clyde Summers, the two basic premises underlying
our national labor policy are that workers need protection and that col-
lective action is the best way to protect the individual. 147 Summers
points out that collective bargaining was meant to equalize bargaining
power and provide industrial democracy with a minimal level of govern-
mental control. 48 He notes that "[c]ollective bargaining was encouraged
as a substitute for governmental control; it was a private process con-
143. Weiler, supra note 5, at 364.
144. Getman & Kohler, The Common-Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Pro-
fessor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415, 1423 (1983).
145. Modjeska, Reflections on the House of Labor, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1013, 1014 (1988).
146. Weiler, supra note 4, at 1825.
147. Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31
BUFFALO L. REv. 9, 10 (1982).
148. Id. at 13.
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structed to serve public purposes for which the law was ultimately re-
sponsible."1 49 One advantage of the collective bargaining process is that
there is less governmental involvement than in wrongful termination ac-
tions. The collective bargaining process, with its private ordering, does
not require recourse to the judicial system each time an individual feels
he or she was wronged. Pursuant to the grievance and arbitration provi-
sion, the employer and employee go through the progressive grievance
system rather than resorting to the courts or an administrative agency.
This maintains the dispute as a private one and saves judicial resources.
The collective bargaining system therefore is more economically effi-
cient than wrongful termination litigation. Lee Modjeska has recognized
that
increasing judicial erosion of the employment at will doctrine... can-
not supplant this system of workplace self-government. Formal,
costly, cumbersome, and lengthy court litigation is no substitute for
the informal, inexpensive, simple, and expeditious relief available
under the grievance and arbitration procedure contained in most col-
lective bargaining agreements. 150
Although unionization may be declining, there is still much to be said in
its favor. It benefits employees by providing collective strength while af-
fording each individual an efficient means to resolve grievances.
Although the stereotype may be that all employers dislike unions, unions
actually may provide some benefits to employers. Unionization at least
provides an employer with an efficient means to resolve employee
disputes.
IV. A Solution
Union affiliation in this country is declining for a multitude of rea-
sons including the economy, 151 the inadequacy of the remedies provided
by the NLRA,152 and the provision of social welfare benefits by govern-
ment. 153 Unions may be in such a precarious state that we, as a society,
may decide that we do not want to risk further decline.
To alleviate the effect that recognition of wrongful termination ac-
tions may have on organized labor, or to negate even the possibility that
wrongful termination actions will weaken organized labor further, the
149. Id. at 13-14; Getman & Kohler, supra note 144, at 1432 (also proposing collective
bargaining as substitute for governmental control).
150. Modjeska, supra note 145, at 1015.
151. Friesen, The Costs of "Fee Speech "--Restrictions on the use of Union Dues to Fund
New Organizing, 15 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 603, 642 (1988).
152. Weiler, supra note 4.
153. Neumann & Rissmann, supra note 6.
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remedies available under collective bargaining agreements must be equal-
ized with those available at common law. Employees covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements should be allowed to recover extra-
contractual damages in arbitration. Equalization of remedies would
eliminate the incentive for unionized employees to bypass their collective
bargaining agreements in favorof the common law. If unionized em-
ployees are afforded the same remedies as their at-will counterparts, the
part of the decline in union membership that is caused by judicial recog-
nition of wrongful termination actions will be eliminated. Equalizing
remedies will maintain the wrongful discharge protection of at-will em-
ployees, while supporting unionization. The collective interest of unioni-
zation will not be sacrificed to protect individual at-will employees.
There are at least two ways to equalize remedies. First, legislation
could be enacted changing the common law so that extra-contractual
remedies would not be available in wrongful termination actions. Sec-
ond, extra-contractual remedies could be allowed in arbitration of dis-
puted discharges.
A. Eliminating Extra-Contractual Remedies from the Common Law
Remedies recoverable under the common law could be equalized
with those available in arbitration by restricting or totally eliminating
extra-contractual remedies currently recoverable in wrongful discharge
actions. States or the federal government could enact statutes restricting
the recovery available in wrongful termination actions to reinstatement
and back pay'and eliminating extra-contractual remedies such as puni-
tive damages.1 54 In addition to these changes, commentators such as
Theodore St. Antoine and Clyde Summers have proposed legislation that
would provide for arbitration155 of unjust terminations of at-will employ-
ees. These statutory arbitration proposals typically recommend a "just
cause" dismissal standard for all employees with a grievance and arbitra-
tion model borrowed from the collective bargaining context. Recovery
would be limited to reinstatement and back pay.1 56
154. Montana, for example, passed a "Wrongful Discharge Act" that limits recovery to
four years lost wages and excludes recovery of damages for emotional distress. This statute
also excludes an award of punitive damages except when the employer has acted fraudulently
or with malice. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
155. Some proposals also suggest an administrative remedy as an alternative to judicial
recourse. See, eg., St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward
Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 57 (1988).
156. St. Antoine, supra note 155; Summers, supra note 26; see also Hill, Arbitration as a
Means of Protecting Empioyees from Unjust Dismissal. A Statutory Proposal, .3 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 111 (1982); Note, Employment at Will. Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory Arbi-
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(1) The Statutory Arbitration Scheme
According to the statutory proposals, at-will employees would have
access to "the same arbitration procedures, have their cases heard by
some of the same arbitrators, and be judged by essentially the same stan-
dards."' 157 Although the scope of the proposed statutes and specific is-
sues such as who bears the cost, what employers and employees are
covered, and whether the statute should cover employees already covered
by a collective bargaining agreement still need to be resolved, commenta-
tors, like Summers for example, suggest some solutions. 158
Employers would welcome Summers's and St. Antoine's proposals
because they limit liability. Summers's proposed arbitration scheme not
only limits employer liability to back pay, but also reduces litigation
costs. Because statutory arbitration legislation presumably would pro-
vide the exclusive remedy for wrongful termination, it would limit litiga-
tion costs and avoid litigation in multiple forums.
Moreover, Summers's and St. Antoine's proposals do provide some
minimal level of protection for at-will employees. Litigation is expensive,
and not all wrongfully discharged employees can afford to sue their for-
mer employers. Because arbitration is less expensive than litigation,
these proposals would make a remedy available to more employees.
(2) The Problems with the Statutory Arbitration Scheme
When originally advanced in 1976, Summers' proposal would have
provided some measure of job security for at-will employees. It is no
longer a viable solution, however, when viewed from the state's or em-
ployee's viewpoint. At-will employees who are successful in wrongful
termination cases in court are likely to receive much more in the way of
compensation than back pay. 159 At-will employees, the plaintiffs' em-
ployment bar, and organized labor 160 therefore are likely to oppose such
tration, 62 WASH. L. REV. 151 (1987) (authored by Warren Martin) (also suggesting arbitra-
tion for at will employees).
157. Summers, supra note 26, at 523. Some proponents of a just cause dismissal standard
suggest that the remedies under their proposed statutes be the same as typical remedies pursu-
ant to collective bargaining agreements, i.e., reinstatement and back pay. See id. at 531. Cf
Note, supra note 156, at 170 ("From the employee's view, the fundamental trade off is a lim-
ited damage remedy in exchange for broad coverage and speedy dispute resolution.").
158. Summers, supra note 26, at 524-31.
159. One study of 120 jury trials in California between 1980 and 1986 revealed that the
"average award, including defense judgments, was $436,626. The average award, excluding
defense judgments, was $646,855. For these forty trials, excluding defense judgments, the av-
erage punitive damages award was $532,170." J. DERTOUZOS, supra note 49.
160. See Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984), appeal
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1012 (1987).
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statutes. While the proposed arbitration statutes provide for reinstate-
ment,1 61 which is not typically available in wrongful termination ac-
tions,1 62 it is unlikely that at-will employees would be willing to give up
in exchange for reinstatement the damage bonanza that currently is
available at common law. Moreover, in the organized labor setting,
[t]he reinstatement has prove[n] to be far less effective in practice than
in theory. It is one thing for the NLRB to calculate the amount of
wages lost and see that this sum is paid to the discharged employee. It
is quite another thing for an outside agency to try to reconstruct an
enduring employment relationship. 163
The relationship between employee and employer may be quite complex.
While some employees might seek reinstatement, recreating the employ-
ment relationship may not be a realistic remedy.
Awarding reinstatement and back pay without at least the possibil-
ity of compensatory and punitive damages does not vindicate the state's
interest in enforcing its public policy, one of the stated reasons for recog-
nizing a cause of action for wrongful termination and for awarding puni-
tive damages in the first place.1' When reinstatement and back pay are
the only remedies available, an employer may find it more economical to
terminate an employee than to comply with the state's' public policy.
Consider, for example, a truck driver who discovers that the milk she is
about to deliver is spoiled.165 Assume that the employer incurs a cost of
$10,000 if the milk is not delivered and that the driver earns $1,000 per
week. It may be cheaper for the employer to fire the truck driver than to
dispose of the milk properly. Not delivering the milk will cost the em-
ployer $10,000. If the driver is fired and the discharged employee is enti-
tled only to back pay, it will cost the employer only $1,000 per week-it
will not cost the employer $10,000 until the employee is out- of work for
ten weeks. In fact, if the employee quickly finds comparable work, the
discharge may cost the employer only trivial transactional costs. This
may, therefore, provide the employer with an incentive to fire the em-
ployee rather than to comply with the state's public policy regarding
healthy milk.
161. See, eg., Summers, supra note 26, at 531.
162. W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REME-
DIES 410-18 (1985); H. PERRrIr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.33 (1987).
163. A. COX, 0. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 47, at 264. The authors discuss two
studies that reveal that only about 40% of employees who were offered their jobs back took
them and of the employees who did go back, nearly 80% were gone within one or two years.
Most blamed their departure on vindictive treatment by the employer.
164. Love, supra note 33, at 587.
165. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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Under a statutory arbitration scheme for at-will employees,
unionized employees no longer would feel that their remedies are inade-
quate as compared to those afforded under the common law. Indeed, the
remedies provided to both unionized and at-will workers would be inade-
quate. Equalization in this manner would eliminate the adverse effect of
wrongful termination actions on unionization, but only to the detriment
of at-will employees and the enforcement of state public policy.
Besides the practical and political difficulties of even enacting such
legislation, statutory arbitration may result in more wrongfully dis-
charged employees. Recently Summers acknowledged that while protec-
tion of at-will employees must be affordable and broadly available, the
remedy must be sufficient to deter future violations by the employer.
Summers recognized that his proposal to compensate only for economic
loss can not fully resolve the dilemma and, in fact, that "there may be no
fully satisfactory solution."' 166
The statutory arbitration proposals are, therefore, subject to the
same criticism that Paul Weiler forcefully applies to the NLRA-the
remedy is too weak to encourage compliance. Weiler faults the current
remedial provisions of the NLRA and points out that, unless there are
stronger sanctions available against employers who violate the NLRA,
there is little to encourage employers to comply with that Act.' 67 Simi-
larly, if recovery in wrongful discharge actions is limited to back pay and
reinstatement, employers have little or no incentive to follow the state's
public policy. The current availability of large damage awards in a com-
mon-law tort action not only encourages employers to scrutinize their
discharge decisions but also encourages employees to pursue litigation
and enforce state public policy.
B. Extra-Contractual Damages in Arbitration
One alternative that has not been explored adequately would require
equalization of the remedies available to at-will and unionized employees
by providing for enhanced damage awards under the NLRA and in arbi-
tration. Under this proposal, by amending the NLRA and by permitting
arbitrators to award compensatory and punitive damages, employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements would be afforded the op-
166. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 7, 26 (1988).
167. Weiler would change the current process used in union representation elections and
argues that unless this is done, changing the remedies provided for by the NLRA would be
ineffective. Weiler, supra note 4, at 1787-1803.
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portunity to recover tort-like damages through their -collective bargain-
ing agreements.
(1) Unionized Workers Are Entitled to Punitive Damages
Any argument that unionized employees are not entitled to extra-
contractual damages because they get the benefits of unionization is un-
persuasive. This argument suggests that while unionized employees get
benefits from unionization, at-will employees get different benefits such
as extra-contractual damages and job security from not unionizing.
There are three problems with this view. First, it characterizes unioniza-
tion as a gift to workers. Under this analysis, workers are entitled only to
some predetermined amount and asking for more is greedy. It presup-
poses that unionization is a benefit bestowed by a benevolent employer
and implicitly denies that unionization is a congressionally mandated
right. Second, it sets the remedies as of the time the NLRA was origi-
nally enacted and does not allow for responses to changes in society, eco-
nomics, or law. In light of the rapid expansion of employment law, labor
law must be allowed to respond. Finally, under Lingle, unionized em-
ployees can get extra-contractual damages if they bring a separate tort
action. This system benefits no one. After Lingle, the employer has to
litigate in multiple forums, the employee must find an attorney for the
tort action and wait years for the enhanced damage award, and unions
may soon be viewed as superfluous. A satisfactory alternative to multiple
forum. litigation must exist. This satisfactory alternative should be acces-
sible to employees, provide remedies adequate to compensate employees,
and encourage employer compliance. Accordingly, extra-contractual
damages should be available in arbitration.
Some commentators have expressed concern regarding the increase
in awards of punitive and compensatory damages in tort actions gener-
ally. 168 Others, however, have argued the need for punitive damages be-
cause plaintiffs are not adequately compensated for breach of contract. 169
The undercompensation of unionized plaintiffs under our current labor
168. See, eg., Ghiardi & Kircher, Punitive Damage Recovery in Products Liability Cases,
65 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1981); Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its
Usefulness, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1141 (984); Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the
Common-Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982); see also,
Mallor, Punitive Dqmages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 449, 475-76 (1985).
169. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205 (1973) ("[W]e must
remember the reasons for punitive and compensatory damages. These reasons include punish-
ing the defendant, deterring the defendant, deterring others, preserving the peace, inducing
private law enforcement, compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses and paying
the plaintiff's attorneys' fees."); Sebert, Pecuniary and Nonpecuniary Damages In Actions
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law has become particularly acute since the rise of wrongful discharge
litigation. Moreover, concerns over the cost of wrongful termination
may be more imagined than real. 170
(2) Employers Would Agree to the Award in Arbitration
In order to receive the primary benefits of arbitration, namely speed
and low cost, employers are likely to agree to the availability of extra-
contractual remedies. Employers also would rather have their potential
liability judged by an arbitrator who is experienced in the industry, famil-
iar with the realities of employment, and who the employer may help
select, than to trust their fate to the perceived whims of juries.
Employers are justifiably concerned about jury awards of punitive
damages. In California, for example, "only 16 percent of wrongful dis-
charge plaintiffs recovered damages for pain and suffering but ... more
than half of the victorious plaintiffs received punitive damages and...
the average award was $716,000."'171 Arbitrators, however, probably
would not mete out punitive damages awards as large as those awarded
by juries. As noted by Dobbs, one reason for awarding punitive damages
is to provide for the cost of an attorney. 172 Employees' attorney fees in
arbitration would not be as high as in litigation and consequently there
would be no need for an award to cover those costs. 173
(3) How It Works: Awarding Punitive Damages in Arbitration
Extra-contractual remedies in arbitration can be made available to
unionized employees in two ways. First, the parties to a collective bar-
gaining agreement could agree to equalize the remedies in the agreement
itself. Second, as a matter of policy, arbitrators could have the power to
award punitive damages. 174 When a unionized employee is discharged,
Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1565 (1986).
170. "Despite the uproar over wrongful termination litigation, the aggregate legal costs are
really not very large.... Even after we include estimates of payments and of legal fees for the
95 percent of all cases that settle without going to trial, the total expense per worker still
amounts to only $12.25." LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 121, at ix.
171. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 187, at A-11 (Sept. 27, 1988) (reporting remarks of
Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. at the Equal Employment Opportunity Conference sponsored by the
Bureau of National Affairs in Washington D.C.).
172. D. DOBBS supra note 169, § 3.8, at 197.
173. One source indicated that the average cost of an arbitration is $1,000 to $2,000 per
case. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at A-7 (March 27, 1987). This should be compared with
$80,000 for defendants in attorney's fees and expenses for the average wrongful termination
action. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES, supra note 121, at 37.
174. This could be effectuated in three ways. First, courts could enforce punitive damage
awards by arbitrators. Second, legislation could be enacted specifying that an arbitrator's
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that employee would have the option of having all common-law claims
relating to the discharge heard by the arbitrator who would in turn have
the authority to award extra-contractual damages. If the employee and
employer agreed to submit all claims to the arbitrator, the employee
would waive any right to pursue a separate wrongful termination claim.
a. The Collectiye Bargaining Agreement Provides for Extra-Contractual
Remedies
In exchange for an agreement empowering the arbitrator to award
punitive damages for an unjust discharge in violation of state public pol-
icy, the union would have to waive the employee's right to bring a state
law cause of action for wrongful discharge or any other similar claim.
There is, however, some authority indicating that such an agreement is
unenforceable. 175 Moreover, even if such an agreement could be en-
forced, waiver would require at least "clear and unmistakable" evidence
of the parties intention.176
If a union may waive its members' rights to bring state law claims,
the availability of extra-contractual remedies in the collective bargaining
agreement could lead a court to find an effective waiver. In return for
waiving the right to seek relief in court, the employee would gain access
to enhanced damages in a quicker and less expensive setting177 than the
judicial system.
Employees may, however, erect a considerable obstacle in the path
toward implementing this method of equalizing remedies. They may
claim that the union waiver infringes on an individual employee's state
award of punitive damages is not, by itself, grounds for refusing to enforce the award. Finally,
we as a society could overcome the tradition of refusing to grant arbitrators the power to
award punitive damages. As discussed at infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text, a labor
arbitrator's inability to award punitive damages is primarily a matter of tradition.
175. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. de Fluiter, 456 N.E.2d 429, 432 (Ind. App.
1983) (parties to contract cannot agree to punitive damages).
176. The union's waiver of an employee's right to bring a state law claim may be prohib-
ited by state law. This prohibition, however, may be preempted by federal law.
Whether a union may waive its members' individual, non preempted state-law rights,
is likewise, a question distinct from that of whether a claim is preempted... and is
another issue we need not resolve today. We note that under Illinois law, the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement may not waive the prohibition against retalia-
tory discharge nor may they alter a worker's rights under the state worker's compen-
sation scheme. Before deciding whether such a state law bar to waiver could be
preempted under federal law by the parties to a collective bar gaining agreement, we
would require 'clear and unmistakable' evi dence... in order to conclude that such a
waiver had been intended..
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) (citations omitted).
177. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rights such as the right to a jury trial.178 In addition, the
parties' agreement to equalize remedies requires them to exercise creativ-
ity, concession, and agreement in a situation that may not be conducive
to any of the aforementioned qualities. Moreover, it implements a piece-
meal approach in a situation in which uniformity is preferred 179 and
contravenes Congress' intent in enacting the federal labor laws to effectu-
ate a national labor policy.
Because of all the drawbacks of such a scheme, Congress should
take matters into its own hands and equalize the remedies by amending
the NLRA to provide for compensatory relief and punitive damages. In
addition, arbitrators should be allowed 180 to award punitive damages
even without specific prior agreement of the parties.' 8'
178. An agreement limiting an employee's right to pursue a wrongful termination claim in
court may pose two problems. First, the right may be unwaivable. See, e.g., Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974). It also may pose state constitutional problems.
By analogy to statutes that limit recovery in medical malpractice actions, such an agreement
could infringe on an employee's state constitutional right to redress in the courts. In Detar
Hospital, Inc. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359, 366 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), for example, the court
held that a statute limiting recovery was unconstitutional because it infringed on the plaintiff's
right to redress. In Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), however, the court held that a similar state statute was constitu-
tional. The constitutional provision at issue in Jones stated that "courts of justice shall be open
to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or charac-
ter, and rights and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice."
Jones, 97 Idaho at 864, 55 P.2d at 404.
Statutes limiting medical malpractice actions also have been challenged as unconstitution-
ally denying access to the courts. In Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp., 419 N.E.2d
1024 (Ind. App. 1981), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802 (1982), a statute that required submis-
sion of all malpractice claims to a panel prior to filing in court was held constitutional. The
Indiana Constitution provided, in relevant part, that "5justice shall be administered... speed-
ily and without delay." 419 N.E.2d 1036. The court held that the statutory procedure did not
violate the state constitution. Id. In Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311 (1983),
however, the court held a similar statutory requirement to be violative of the state constitution.
In so deciding it apparently relied on the prohibition against deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process, and the right to petition government for redress.
Finally, statutes attempting to limit medical malpractice actions by requiring submission
of all claims to pretrial panels have been challenged as denying a state constitutional right to a
jury trial. In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Op. 1976), and
Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976), the statutory
schemes were held to violate the state constitutional right to a trial by jury.
179. See, e.g., Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962).
180. The allowance should be created judicially, legislatively, and as a matter of overcom-
ing a tradition that no longer serves a useful purpose.
181. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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b. The Parties Agree to Allow the Arbitrator to Award Punitive Damages
After a Discharge
Arbitrators should award punitive damages in appropriate cases. 182
The employee who alleges the employer lacked just cause for the dis-
charge is saying that the discharge violated the collective bargaining
agreement proviso that employees will be fired only for cause. Labor
arbitrations are, in essence, breach of contract actions. Although black
letter contract law generally provides that punitive damages are not re-
coverable for breach of contract, the exceptions that exist should be used
to equalize arbitration awards with the recovery available in wrongful
discharge actions. 18 3 If the breach of contract also involves the tort of
wrongful discharge, the arbitrator should award extra-contractual dam-
ages, including recovery for pain and suffering and punitive damages. 184
182. This Article only points out the desirability of allowing arbitrators to award punitive
damages in order to equalize the remedies available in arbitration with those recoverable in
wrongful termination actions. It is not intended to function as an exact working model for
how this process should work. One of the problems in providing a model for how arbitrators
would go about awarding punitive damages is the fact that there is no one concrete reason why
arbitrators generally do not award punitive damages now. One explanation is the notion that
labor laws, like the NLRA, are meant to be remedial, not punitive. Following this philosophy,
labor arbitrators may be reluctant to award punitive damages. There is a dispute whether
arbitrators or courts have the power to award punitive damages under Section 301. See infra
notes 192-200 and accompanying text. Accordingly, saying that arbitrators should award pu-
nitive damages may require legislation as well as changes in traditional theory about labor law
and the role of arbitration.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 provides: "Punitive damages are
not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a
tort for which punitive damages are recoverable."
In some instances the breach of contract-is also a tort, as may be the case for a breach of
duty by a public utility. Under modem rules of procedure, the complaint may not show
whether the plaintiff intends his case to be regarded as one in contract or one in tort. The rule
stated in this section does not preclude an award of punitive damages in such a case if such an
award would be proper under the law of torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
(1965). The term "tort" in the rule stated in this section is elastic, and the effect of the general
expansion of tort liability to protect additional interests is to make punitive damages somewhat
more widely available for breach of contract as well. Some courts have gone rather far in this
direction. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.31 n. 12
(1981).
184. Woodson v. AMF Leisureland Centers, Inc., 842 F.2d 699 (3rd Cir. 1988); Wojciak
v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675 (Minn. 1981); Hansome v. Northwestern Coop-
erage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984); Flanigan v. Prudential Say. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d
257 (Mont. 1986); Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Krein v. Marian
Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987); Carnation Co. v. Bomer, 610 S.W. 450
(Tex. 1980); Bell v. Barre Elec. Supply Co., 499 A.2d 786 (Vt. 1985); Wiggins v. Eastern Ass'n
Coal Corp., 357 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1987); Monge v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App 3d 503,
222 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1986); but see Mynay v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1989)
(no punitive damages in claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Savage
v. Holiday Inn Corp. Inc., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); Grywczynski v. Shasta Beverages
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Extra-contractual damages should be available under the same terms as
they are under common-law wrongful termination claims.
The availability of extra-contractual damages in arbitration would
encourage the wrongfully discharged union employee to arbitrate her
wrongful termination claim along with her breach of contract action. An
employee would agree to have the arbitrator resolve both issues with the
knowledge that the arbitrator has the authority to award more than back
pay. In essence, the employee would be exchanging the right to bring a
common-law tort action for the possibility of enhanced damages in arbi-
tration. The availability of higher punitive damages in court will not lure
wrongfully discharged employees away from arbitration. The difference
in punitive awards will be one of degree only as opposed to the existing
system in which punitive damages basically are unavailable in arbitra-
tion. The employee would be willing to give up the right to sue in court
because the incentive for bypassing the collective bargaining agreement
would be eliminated.
Employees would gain the benefits of the speedy and economical
forum provided by arbitration without giving up the possibility of an en-
hanced damage award. By allowing arbitrators to hear the common-law
claim and to award punitive damages, the arbitration process possibly
might become slower and more expensive. There is no reason to believe,
however, that arbitration would become as costly or cumbersome as a
wrongful discharge action in court. Wrongful termination litigation is
expensive and this expense may prevent an employee from bringing suit.
As one commentator has noted, "[w]rongful termination litigation is fact
intensive and requires extensive pretrial discovery .... Unless the em-
ployee's damages are significant, cost considerations may preclude bring-
ing meritorious cases." 185
Inc., 606 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Peterson v. Culver Educ. Found. 402 N.E.2d 448 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980) (denying punitives on facts, as opposed to nature of claim); De Rose v. Putnam
Management Co., 398 Mass. 205, 496 N.E.2d 428 (1986) (denying punitives on facts as op-
posed to nature of claim).
185. Note, supra note 156, at 161. If an employee does not waive the right, there are two
options: 1) the case goes to arbitration but there is no possibility of an enhanced award; or 2)
the case goes to arbitration with the possibility of an enhanced award. If the employee is given
extra-contractual damages without waiving the right to pursue a common-law remedy, she
would have less incentive to pursue judicial remedies; even if she did file in court, double
recovery could be barred. If the employee is not awarded extra-contractual damages in arbi-
tration, the employee could try to pursue the action in court. As this is the result precluded by
Lingle, the employer's position is not worsened by the arbitrator's ability to award extra-con-
tractual damages.
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Because of the advantages to this system, employers are likely to
agree to arbitration of the wrongful discharge aspect of the claim.1 S6 At-
torneys for management have been advising their non-unionized clients
to consider some form of alternative dispute resolution to avoid the high
cost of litigating wrongful discharge claims. 1 7 Employers' attorney fees
can amount to $40,000 at the summary judgment stage.188 As noted by
those who advocate statutory arbitration for the wrongful discharge
claims of at-will employees:
[A]rbitrators have evolved accepted standards for what constitutes just
cause for discipline, developed fair and efficient procedures for deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of accused employees, exercised respon-
sibility for reviewing the appropriateness of penalties, and provided
effective remedies of reinstatement and back pay. For arbitrators, pro-
tection against unjust discipline has long ceased being "unchartered
territory."18 9
Arbitrators commonly modify the sanction unless the collective bargain-
ing agreement expressly provides to the contrary. 90 One commentator
remarked that "substance abuse, stress on the job, treatment of handi-
capped employees, and sexual and racial harassment on the job are all
issues that may require an arbitrator to fashion a remedy. Legal prece-
dent has established that arbitrators are allowed great latitude in award-
ing remedies."'19 Moreover, arbitrators are more experienced than
judges in the "law of the shop" and other aspects of the employment
relationship. 192 There is, therefore, no reason to believe that arbitrators
would be unable to fashion punitive damage awards in appropriate cases.
c. Arbitrators Have the Power to Award Punitive Damages
While there is some authority for the proposition that arbitrators
lack the power to award exemplary damages, there is also authority to
186. See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 244, at A-3 (Dec. 22, 1987) (reporting remarks of
Allen Gross at the 1987 Employment Law Conference).
187. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at A-7 (Mar. 20, 1987) (reporting remarks made by
Mary Aileen O'Callaghan at Mid-Winter Meeting of the ABA Committee on Employee Rights
and Responsibilities).
188. Individual Employment Rights, Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) vol. 5, no. 4, at 4 (Mar. 27,
1990).
189. Summers, supra note 26, at 499.
190. Id. at 531 (comparing powers of arbitrators under his proposed scheme with those of
arbitrators working under union collective bargaining agreements today).
191. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 200, at A-15 (Oct. 9, 1986) (reporting remarks by L.
Lawrence Schultz, arbitrator and professor at University of San Diego, made at I 1th Annual
Collective Bargaining Conference on October 8, 1986 by the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service).
192. Cf Summers, supra note 26, at 521 (citing advantages of proposed arbitration
statute).
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the contrary. 193 Arbitrators' reluctance to award punitive damages
seems to be more a matter of tradition than of legality.1 94 Although an
arbitrator may be reluctant to award punitives damages because doing so
might harm the arbitrator's long term relationship with the union or the
employer, this goes to the arbitrator's discretion in awarding punitive
damages and not to her power to do so.195
There is disagreement among the few courts that have considered
the question whether punitive damages are recoverable in an arbitration
or in court on a section 301 claim for breach of contract. 196 Those courts
193. Compare Local 416, Sheetmetal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Hegesteel Corp., 335 F. Supp.
812, 815 (W.D. Wis. 1971) (award of punitive damages in arbitration not illegal per se), rev'd
on other grounds, 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1974) with International Union of Operating Eng'rs
v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (arbitrator has no authority to
award punitive damages absent explicit language in contract).
194. "Through the years private contract and custom have shaped the principal features of
arbitration." F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 38, at 26; Stipanowich, Punitive Damages
in Arbitration, Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953, 953-54 (1986).
195. The reluctance of arbitrators to award punitive damages and possibly endanger good
working relationships with the union and the employers would dissipate as the awards of ex-
tra-contractual damages become more common and as employers realized that either the arbi-
trator would award them or the jury would.
196. These cases should be distinguished from those addressing the question whether puni-
tive damages are recoverable from a union in a breach of the duty of fair representation claim
that combined with a section 301 claim for breach of contract against the employer. In Inter-
national Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42 (1979), the Supreme Court held that
punitive damages are not recoverable against a union in a claim for breach of the duty of fair
representation under the Railway Labor Act. The parameters of Foust are still unclear. The
Court stated that it had "granted certiorari to resolve this conflict among the Courts of Ap-
peals as to what if any circumstances justify assessing punitive damages against a union that
breaches its duty of fair representation." Id. at 46. The Court, however, expressed "no view
on the propriety of punitive awards in suits under the Landrum-Griffin Act." Id. at 47 n.9.
Some lower courts have held that Foust prohibits punitive damages in section 301 claims
under the NLRA. See, e.g., Refino v. Feuer Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 562, 568 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980). Even if, however, the Supreme Court
extends Foust as aperse rule prohibiting punitive damages awards against unions in fair repre-
sentation cases under the NLRA, there would be no problem in allowing an employee to
recover punitive damages from the employer in a tort claim combined with a breach of con-
tract action and still prohibiting such recovery against the union. The Supreme Court in Faust
reasoned that holding unions liable for punitive damages could seriously undermine a union's
viability. Such awards could deplete union treasuries, thereby impairing the effectiveness of
unions as collective-bargaining agents. Imposing this risk on employees, whose welfare de-
pends upon the strength of their union, is too great a price for whatever deterrent effect puni-
tive damages may have. Id. at 50-51. This reasoning is inapposite to holding employers liable
for punitive damages. Allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages would cause union
employees to rely on their collective bargain ing agreements rather than circumvent them.
This, in turn, would meet the Foust Court's decision to protect unions. Moreover, the punitive
damages would be awarded for the wrongful discharge public policy aspect of the claim. If
punitive damages were awarded, they would go to the employee or the union, or they could be
apportioned between the two.
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that have directly addressed the question whether.-an arbitrator may
award punitive damages for a breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment have come to differing results. Moreover, even those that have re-
versed an arbitrator's punitive damage award have left open the
possibility that, in other circumstances, such an award in fact may be
appropriate. The statement of the standard that must be met in order for
an arbitrator to award punitive damages also varies from court to
court. 
19 7
Other cases have addressed the question whether a court may award
punitive damages under section 301. Collectively, these cases suggest
that under appropriate circumstances, an employer may be liable for pu-
nitive damages. In allowing exemplary damages under section 301 in
Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, 198 the court reasoned
that if such damages would be a "uniquely effective device for changing a
specific pattern of illegal conduct by a party before the court, it comes
within the remedial purpose of the labor laws, even though the defendant
may suffer as if he had been 'punished'" for other reasons.1 99
197. In Howard P. Foley Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 639, 789 F.2d
1421 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, the court suggested that an arbitrator could award punitive
damages if such a remedy was provided for in the collective bargaining agreement or if there
was "substantiating proof of willful or wanton conduct." Id In Refino v. Feuer Transp., Inc.,
the court noted that in order for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages, he must demonstrate
"a willful abuse of a duty imposed as a result of [the employer's] position of authority or trust
as well as a breach of contract." 480 F. Supp. 562, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting Holodnick v.
Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975)). This variation
regarding the standard for awarding exemplary damages merely parallels the confusion in the
articulated standard for punitive damages in breach of contract cases generally. See United
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 1139 v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods.,
Litton Sys., Inc., 704 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1983); Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. v. Webster
Clothes, Inc., 596 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1979); Westinghouse Elec. v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 561 F.2d 521, 523-24 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1036 (1978);
Safeway Stores v. Int'l Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers Automotive Lodge, No. 1486,
534 F. Supp. 638, 640-41 (D. Md. 1982) (suggesting that punitive damages can be awarded if
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement or if proof of willful or wanton conduct).
But see College Hall Fashions, Inc. v. Philadelphia Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of Am., 408 F. Supp. 722, 727 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (punitive damages may be awarded by arbitra-
tion only if expressly provided for in the collective bargaining agreement).
198. 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. II1. 1966). The court reserved the question whether it would
be appropriate on the facts of the case to order punitive damages for its deterrent value. The
court held only that punitive damage awards were permissible under section 301.
199. Id at 671; see also International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union, No. 117 v. Wash-
ington Employers, Inc., 557 F.2d 1345 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977) (while reserving judgment on this
question, the court noted that other courts were split as to whether punitive damages were
allowable under section 301); Pierce v. Fox Mfg. Co., 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2321, 2324 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) ("The purpose of punitive damages is to insure that the objectionable conduct is not
repeated, and may justify an award of punitive damages against both the unions and defendant
Fox [the employer]."); Patrick v. I.D. Packing Co., 308 F. Supp., 821, 823-24 (S.D. Iowa 1969)
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An additional explanation for the reluctance of arbitrators to award
punitive damages is the notion that our federal labor law was meant to be
remedial, not punitive, in nature. This rationale may have supported the
mild remedial provisions of the NLRA at the time of its enactment, but
no longer is tenable. Although adopting a different approach to labor
law reform, Paul Weiler states that "back pay and reinstatement...
simply are not effective deterrents to employers who are tempted to tram-
ple on their employees' rights. ' '2° Moreover, punitive damages are nec-
essary when the amount of back pay awarded may be so small that
punitives are necessary to "punish the employer for past misconduct and
to deter future misconduct. '201
Because many section 301 claims also could have been brought as
unfair labor practice proceedings before the NLRB, section 10(c) of the
NLRA also must be amended to provide for monetary remedies in addi-
tion to back pay. This amendment also is necessary to protect those em-
ployees who are engaged in other concerted activities "for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ' 20 2 Employees
who are, for example, discharged for their union organizing efforts have
engaged in conduct that is arguably protected by section seven and,
therefore, the NLRB would have primary jurisdiction under Garmon v.
San Diego Building Trades Council. 203 Accordingly, under the Garmon
preemption doctrine, these employees would be complainants before the
NLRB, and not the courts. Lingle, 204 however, leaves open the question
of whether a wrongful termination claim (as opposed to a breach of con-
tract action) of a victim of an unfair labor practice would be preempted.
Employees who are discharged as the result of unfair labor practices
should stand in as good of a position as their co-workers whose dis-
charges constitute breaches of collective bargaining agreements that can
be taken to arbitration.
Section 301 should be amended to provide that the federal courts
may grant appropriate relief including, but not limited to, compensatory
damages, reinstatement, and punitive damages. In addition, Congress
should provide that an arbitrator's award may not be overturned by the
(there is authority for proposition that exemplary damages might be awarded against employer
in proper case under section 301).
200. Weiler, supra note 4, at 1788-89.
201. Love, supra note 33, at 587.
202. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1973).
203. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); see note 58 and
accompanying text.
204. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.8.
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federal courts solely on the ground that the arbitrator awarded extra-
contractual damages.20 5
Congress appears to have some interest in imposing sterner sanc-
tions against those who commit unfair labor practices. In 1977 and
1978, Congress considered labor reform legislation that passed through
the House easily, but was narrowly defeated in the Senate. 20 6 The Labor
Reform Act would have provided "beefed-up penalties and remedies" 20 7
in addition to rules regarding nonemployee access during organizational
campaigns and expediting union elections. The enhanced penalties and
remedies portion would have allowed for disbarment of all federal con-
tractors who willfully violated an NLRB order, and would have provided
a "make whole" remedy for employees if their employer refused to bar-
gain and a 150 percent back pay provision 2 8 for employees discharged as
the result of an unfair labor practice. The enhanced back pay provision
was necessary because:
[Tihe present system of compensating ... is inadequate. The threat of
back pay awards simply does not deter discharges . . . . It does hot
adequately compensate the employee for the true loss he has incurred.
It fails to recognize the gravity of the employer's conduct both with
respect to its effect on the employee and the union's organizing
drive.20 9
It is time to change the philosophy regarding our national labor policy
that labor laws only were meant to be remedial. In the years since pas-
sage of the original Wagner Act, our society, our economics, and our
laws have changed. Accordingly, arbitrators should have the power to
order compensatory and punitive damages in appropriate cases.
205. This amendment scheme would not alter the current procedure if a union fails to
pursue the employee's grievance. The employee still could bring a section 301 claim alleging
breach of the collective bargaining agreement by the employer and breach of the duty of fair
representation by the union. As a result of this amendment the court could, however, have the
authority to order extra-contractual damages at least as against the employer. These employ-
ees would then be. in the same position vis-a-vis damages as their co-workers who went to
arbitration with the union's help. The court's ability to award punitive damages against the
union would depend on whether Congress makes an explicit statement regarding Foust's appli-
cability to the NLRA or, if Congress remains silent, the courts will have to decide this
question.
206. Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1 (1979).
207. Id. at 9.
208. 200% in the House version. Id. at 17, n.62.
209. 'Rosen, supra note 206, at 19 (quoting 123 CoNG. REc. S12358 (daily ed. July 19,
1977) (address of Senator Williams)).
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Conclusion
Collective bargaining agreements protect employees from unjust dis-
charge. Unionized employees discharged in violation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement may seek reinstatement and back pay. This
protection is made possible because of the collective strength of unions.
Until recently, at-will employees had no such protection from arbitrary
discharge. Judicial erosion of the employment at will doctrine, however,
has provided some measure of job security to at-will employees by recog-
nizing a cause of action for wrongful termination. An at-will employee
who is discharged in violation of public policy now can recover tort
damages.
Because the tort damages available to individuals in a wrongful dis-
charge action are far greater than those available under a collective bar-
gaining agreement, unionized workers are now filing tort actions instead
of relying on the grievance and arbitration process. This phenomena
may be contributing to the decline in unionization in this country.
Courts have grappled with the question whether unionized employ-
ees should be allowed to sue their employers for wrongful discharge in
addition to pursuing their collectively bargained for remedies. Most
courts addressed the question in terms of whether a wrongful discharge
claim by a unionized employee should be preempted by the NLRA.
Prior case law mandated a case by case approach, and the courts in turn
considered whether each particular wrongful termination claim was pre-
empted. Accordingly, the courts determined whether it was fair or just
to preempt a particular individual's claim of wrongful discharge.
This Article has suggested that the effect of wrongful termination
actions on unions needs to be scrutinized. To alleviate the negative effect
that the existence of wrongful termination actions may be having on
unions, we must reduce the incentive unionized workers have to file tort
actions. We also must encourage reliance on the collective bargaining
process. In seeking these goals we must be careful, however, to continue
to protect at-will workers. To protect at-will individuals and collective
bargaining we must equalize the remedies by making punitive damages
available in arbitration and under the NLRA. This proposed solution
will allow at-will employees to vindicate their individual rights without
sacrificing the collective strength of unions.
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